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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, concern for animals has grown, particularly due
to increased interest in the ethics and practice of veganism. Nevertheless,
humans continue to inflict senseless suffering on animals, and the law
regarding the manner in which we deal with animal cruelty offenders remains

in a rudimentary state. The United States has been slow to criminalize
comprehensively and penalize fittingly human cruelty towards animals. This
is attributable to the lack of consistent, broad definitions of animal cruelty,
and established, considered jurisprudence regarding the objectives, principles,
and other matters that should inform the sentencing of animal cruelty
offenders. As a consequence, such offenders can receive varied penalties for
the same crimes in different jurisdictions, and some of those sanctions are
unduly lenient, while others are unduly harsh. These outcomes are
unacceptable given the widespread suffering experienced by animals at the
hands of humans, and the importance of coherent criminal law and sentencing
practice, which is the domain where society (through the courts) acts in its
most coercive manner against individuals. This Article addresses these
shortcomings and furthers current federal law by advancing a model approach
to the criminalization of cruelty towards animals and sentencing of animal
cruelty offenders, which we argue should apply in all American jurisdictions.
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Unlike the recently enacted Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act
(PACT) Act, we propose the development of a classification of animal cruelty
offenses that differentiates between animals on the basis of their sentience. As
there are many different animals, it is not tenable to particularize criminal law
and sentencing practice in relation to each species. Nevertheless, scientific
investigation has established that vertebrates (animals with a spine)' have
greater sentience (ability to perceive through their senses) 2 and greater
capacity to feel pain than other animals. 3 Thus, in accordance with the
principle of proportionality, 4 we argue that it is important to treat offenses

against vertebrates as especially warranting censure and punishment. We also
suggest broadening current definitions of animal cruelty and removing
exclusions of certain acts from them in order to encapsulate the varied nature
and context of such offending. In particular, we consider that definitions of
animal cruelty should include, in addition to cruelty towards companion
animals (who generally enjoy higher levels of legal protection than other
animals), cruelty towards animals that people use for food, clothing, research,
sport and entertainment, and animals that live in the wild. Further, "humanuse typologies" (the ways in which humans use animals) 5 are irrelevant and
therefore, should not be relied upon to determine whether an offense of animal
cruelty has occurred.
At present, sentencing law regarding animal cruelty offenses is flawed
because it strives to achieve the objectives of general deterrence and specific
deterrence. 6 Research demonstrates that increases to the harshness of
sanctions do not correlate with lower rates of commission of crime and
recidivism.7 Rehabilitation is another objective of sentencing law.8 If animal
cruelty offenders demonstrate good prospects of reform, we consider that this
could be a mitigating factor in sentencing them. Community protection is also

1.
1989).

19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 561 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed.

2.

2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1942 (C.T.

Onions ed., 3d ed. 1973).
3.
See Lynne U. Sneddon et al., Defining and Assessing Animal Pain, 97 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 201, 204 (2014).
4.
See infra Part III.
5.
See generally JessicaEisen, LiberatingAnimalLaw: Breaking Freefrom Human-Use
Typologies, 17 ANIMAL L. 59, 61-62 (2010) (describing the human-use paradigm).
6.
See infra Part III.
7.
See generally Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and
Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 155-89 (2003) (reviewing
empirical literature on the relationship between harsher criminal sentences and deterrence).
8.
See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1998).
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currently an objective of sentencing law.9 We recommend that, in sentencing
animal cruelty offenders, community protection remain a relevant
consideration, particularly because cruelty towards animals can precede and
co-occur with the commission of offenses against humans.1 0 Above all,
however, we propose that the chief determinant of penalties for animal cruelty
offenses should be the principle of proportionality, which provides that the
harshness of the sanction should match the seriousness of the offense."
In discussing the application of the principle of proportionality, we

consider whether the death of an animal because of a human act of cruelty
should aggravate the gravity of the offense. This would certainly be the case
if an offender murdered a person, but there is potentially a significant
difference between offenses committed against at least some animals and
those committed against humans. While humans generally exhibit an
understanding of their ongoing existence and concept of the future, not all
animals do so. We nonetheless consider that if scientific evidence indicates
that an animal is aware of its ongoing existence and has a clear preference for
remaining alive, causing the death of that animal through an act of cruelty
could be a factor that increases the severity of the offense.1 2 This is because
the animal will have lost its expectation of future life. In addition, we maintain
that the death of an animal through an act of cruelty would make the crime
more serious where it causes distress to a human (most typically where the
animal is a person's pet) or suffering of another animal, one that depended on
the killed animal (for example, where the animal that is killed was nurturing
its offspring).
More broadly, we propose that three matters in particular should inform
the classification of animal cruelty offenses and the sentencing of them. These
matters are science, social norms, and moral theory. First, we consider that
scientific evidence about animals' capacity to feel pain and suffer should
influence the law regarding animal cruelty offending for the reason that it can
indicate the impact on animals of different forms of human cruelty. We now
know that many vertebrates feel physical pain that is the same as that

9.
See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 453, 464-68 (1997) (suggesting that incapacitation theories of punishment are grounded
in community protection goals).
10. Christopher Hensley et al., Exploring the Social and EmotionalContext of Childhood
Animal Cruelty andIts PotentialLink to Adult Human Violence, 24 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 489,
497-98 (2018).
11. Mirko Bagaric, The PunishmentShould Fit the Crime Not the Prior Convictions of
the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to

Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 348 (2014).
12. See infra Part III.
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experienced by humans and prefer to avoid it.1 3 Cruelty towards vertebrates,
therefore, should be sanctioned more heavily than cruelty towards animals
that lack receptors to register pain. It is also clear that some animals are able
to suffer psychological harm.' 4 Accordingly, such pain should also influence
the law relating to animal cruelty offenses. The extent of pain that scientific
investigation indicates animals experience as a consequence of human cruelty
can inform the application of the principle of proportionality in determining
an appropriate penalty for this offending.

Second, scientific evidence regarding animals' capacity to feel pain will
most probably in time (if it has not already) inform social norms regarding the
appropriate treatment of animals. We maintain in this Article that, given the
strong connection between criminal law and normative values," it is vital that
the latter, where they pertain to human interaction with animals generally, are
taken into account in the classification and sentencing of animal cruelty
offenses. The law concerning animal cruelty offending will garner respect and
retain legitimacy only if it reflects, at least to some degree, current, accepted
attitudes regarding the ways in which humans relate to animals. A key
contemporary normative principle that we argue must inform the law is that
humans should not cause animals to unduly suffer pain.
Third, morality shapes social norms, and therefore, the law.1 6 In this
Article, we demonstrate that the application of the two major streams of moral
theories-consequentialist and non-consequentialist-establishes that many
animals have what is described in philosophy as "moral status" or "moral
standing." As a consequence, it is ethically imperative that we take those
animals' interests into account in our decision-making about whether human
behavior towards them is morally right or wrong. Notwithstanding differences
between them, these moral theories justify according legal protection to
animals that have moral standing through how we define animal cruelty
offenses and sentence those who breach them.
In this Article, we demonstrate that the above proposal would remedy
current problems with the law concerning animal cruelty offending. In

particular, it would lead to more coherent and consistent categorization of
these offenses and sentencing of offenders. If the main consideration that
13. See Sneddon et al., supra note 3.
14. See Franklin D. McMillan et al., Behavioral and Psychological Characteristicsof
Canine Victims ofAbuse, 18 J. APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCI 92, 102-03 (2015) [hereinafter
McMillan et al., Characteristicsof Canine Victims]; Franklin D. McMillan, Behavioral and
Psychological Outcomes for Dogs Sold as Puppies Through Pet Stores and/or Born in
Commercial Breeding Establishments: Current Knowledge and Putative Causes, 19 J.
VETERINARY BEHAV. 14, 21-22 (2017) [hereinafter McMillan, Outcomesfor Dogs].
15. See Mirko Bagaric, The "Civil-isation" ofthe CriminalLaw, 25 CRIM. L.J. 184, 187

(2001).
16.

See id.
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informs this area of the law is the principle of justice that the punishment
should match the crime, it will better reflect normative standards and often
result in the imposition of harsher sentences on animal cruelty offenders.
In the next part of the Article, we explain the current law regarding animal
cruelty offenses, and sentencing law and practice in relation to offenders who
breach it in the United States. This is followed in Part III by a discussion of
the objectives and principles that at present do, and those that we argue should,
inform the sentencing of animal cruelty offenders. In Part IV, we examine
other matters that we consider should influence the classification of animal
cruelty offenses and sentencing of them, namely: scientific research
concerning animals' capacity to feel pain; social norms regarding human
interaction with animals; and moral theories that justify ascribing moral status.
The reform recommendations are detailed in Part V and are summarized in
the concluding remarks.
II.

THE CURRENT LAW REGARDING ANIMAL CRUELTY

OFFENSES

AND

SENTENCING OF THEM IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Overview of Sentencing Law and Practice

Prior to examining animal cruelty crimes and the manner in which

offenders are currently sentenced for them, we provide an overview of the
framework of sentencing law. This helps to explain the approach to the
sentencing of animal cruelty offenders at present and the context for the
reform proposals advanced in this Article.
Each jurisdiction in the United States has its own sentencing law. i
However, several key similarities underpin sentencing in all the jurisdictions.
In particular, there is a commonality regarding the key sentencing objectives,
namely, community protection, general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution.18 These (frequently competing) objectives are given effect

through sanctions imposed on offenders and the nature of the sanction is often
informed by prescriptive pre-determined penalties set out in penalty grids. 19
Typically, most jurisdictions implement the sentencing approach that was

adopted at the federal level.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines exemplify prescribed penalty laws
and sentencing guidelines that are a defining feature of American sentencing
17. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 37 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40-41 (2006); see also 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 26.1(b) (4thed. 2015).
18.

See infra Part III.

19.

See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 8, at 71.
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law. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been analyzed more than any
other prescribed penalty system in the United States. 2 They are also important
because they have significantly influenced sentencing at the state level, and
of course, have had an impact on the many offenders who have been sentenced
under them. 21 Moreover, application of them has resulted in a growth in
incarceration levels. 22 Melissa Hamilton notes that the "federal government
now operates the single largest criminal justice system by inmate count in the
United States. Indeed, the federal prison system itself is among the top ten
largest by country in the world." 23 In addition, it has been acknowledged that:
[H]istory proves that decisions made in Washington affect the whole
criminal justice system, for better or worse. Federal funding drives
state policy, and helped create our current crisis of mass
incarceration. And the federal government sets the national tone,
which is critical to increasing public support and national momentum
for change. Without a strong national movement, the bold reforms
needed at the state and local level cannot emerge. 24
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are similar to other grid sentencing
systems in that an offender's prior convictions and the perceived severity of
his or her crime are the major determinants of the penalty that is imposed. 25

Criminal history can account for a significant increase in penalty severity. 26

20. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison ofFederalandState Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1997).
21 See Berman & Bibas, supra note 17, at 40. There are more than 200,000 federal
prisoners. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS
IN
2013,
at
2
tbl.1
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty-pbdetail&iid=5109 [https://penna.cc/SLP7-FXVU]. Also, as noted below, the broad
structure of the Federal Guidelines is similar to many other guideline systems in that the penalty
range is not mandatory and permits departures in certain circumstances. See infra note 32 and
accompanying text.
22. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 62 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).

23.
(2017).

Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Disparities, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 176, 182

24.

AMES C. GRAWERT ET AL., A FEDERAL AGENDA TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION

1
(2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/a%2Ofederal
%20agenda%20to%20reduce%20mass%20incarceration.pdf [https://penna.cc/7FJN-V8ZL].
25. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?,
88 B.U. L. REv. 1109, 1115 (2008).
26. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2018).
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For example, a level fifteen 27 crime in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
mandates a presumptive penalty of eighteen to twenty-four months of
incarceration for a first offender, and forty-one to fifty-one months for an
offender with thirteen or more criminal history points. 28 A level thirty-five
crime prescribes 168-210 months (or fourteen to seventeen and a half years)

of incarceration for a first time offender, and 292-365 months (twenty-four to
thirty and a half years) of imprisonment for an offender with the highest
criminal history score. 29

Although criminal history score and offense severity are the two most
important considerations that influence the nature and severity of the criminal
sanction, many other factors affect the decision about which penalty is
imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as well.30 Also, judges are
allowed to deviate from a guideline 31when certain mitigating and aggravating
considerations apply; such considerations take the form of adjustments and
departures.3 2 Adjustments are considerations that increase or decrease the
designated amount of a penalty. 33 For example, an offender who shows
remorse can have his or her penalty decreased by up to two levels, while an
offender who pleads guilty can have his or her penalty lowered by three
levels. 34 Departures 35 also facilitate courts' imposition of sentences outside a
given guideline range. 36 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(b) empowers courts to use

considerations that are not specified in the Guidelines as rationales for

27.
28.
offending
29.

Offense levels range from 1 (least serious) to 43 (most serious). Id § 5A.
The criminal history score ranges from 0 (least offending record) to 13 or more (worst
record). Id.
Id.

30. AMY BARON-EVANS & JENNIFER NILES COFFIN, NO MORE MATH WITHOUT
SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING THE GUIDELINES' PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON
MITIGATING FACTORS, at i (rev. ed. 2011).

31. Id.
32. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2018) (providing that a court may consider the defendant's background in deciding whether to
depart from the sentencing guidelines).
33. These are set out in Chapter 3 of the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. See
id. § 3.
34. See id. § 3E1.1. However, § 5K2.0(d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart from a
guideline range as a result of:
The defendant's decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a
plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure may not be based merely
on the fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement,
but a departure may be based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a
sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by
the court.
35. See id. § 5K.
36. Id. ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
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departing from the applicable guideline range.3 7 However, when judges
invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), they must specify their reason or reasons for
stepping outside the range. 38 In other words, they must provide some details
justifying their sentencing decision. Thus, even in a largely prescriptive

guideline sentencing system, courts generally have a considerable degree of
flexibility to adapt the penalty to the particular facts of the case and the profile
of the offender. 39
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court stipulated that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were, in fact, advisory rather than mandatory, 40 and

'

this is reflected in the practice that, each year, approximately 50% of the
sentences imposed are outside of the penalty range set out in the Guidelines. 4
B.

Animal Cruelty Offenses and Their Sentences

No law at the United States federal level provides a general prohibition
on animal cruelty. The recently enacted Preventing Animal Cruelty and
Torture Act 2019 (PACT Act) has some relevance in this context, as it

criminalizes the intentional infliction of "serious bodily injury" on an
animal. 42 The PACT Act is not intended, however, to operate as general anti-

cruelty statute, but instead is aimed at criminalizing acts of animal cruelty that
underlie the creation of so-called "crush videos", which themselves are

37. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B); see also Pepperv. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 500 (2011); Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 38 (2007).
38.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K2.0(e).

39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
40. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,259 (2005) (excising the provision making
the Guidelines mandatory as contrary to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); see also
Pepper, 562 U.S. at 481 ("[W]hen a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district
court at resentencing may consider evidence . . [that may] support a downward variance from
the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range."); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.
708, 715 (2008) ("[T]here is no longer a limit comparable to the one at issue in Burns on the
variances from Guidelines ranges that a district court may find justified under the sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."); Gall, 552 U.S. at 41 ("[W]hile the extent of the
difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely
relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.");
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that federal appellate courts may apply
presumption of reasonableness to district court sentence that is within properly calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range).
41. For example, 48.6% of sentences in 2016 fell within the guideline range, with a slight
increase to 49.1% in 2017. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2017).
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 48(a)(1), (f)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-72).
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criminalized by the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act 2010.43 Offenses
under the PACT Act are subject to a fine, imprisonment of up to seven years,
or both. 4
There are, nonetheless, comprehensive animal cruelty statutes in all fifty
states. 45 Sentencing law and practice for animal cruelty offenses generally fit
within the approach to sentencing outlined above, but the nature and content
of those crimes differs throughout the United States, and often, there are no
prescribed minimum penalties. 46 We provide an overview of the law in this
area and its application by examining examples of relevant legislation and
cases in the five largest states in America. 47 This discussion contextualizes the
reform proposals in the Article.
1.

Overview ofLegislation Concerning Animal Cruelty Offenses
a.

California

California Penal Code § 597 is the primary law prohibiting animal abuse
in California. Under this provision, "animal" refers to "every dumb creature"
and thus, the provision covers a wide range of animals, including wild
animals, strays, pets, and farm animals. 48 Under

§ 597, the following acts are

prohibited:
*

Maliciously and intentionally torturing, maiming, wounding,
mutilating, or killing an animal; 49

*

Overloading or overworking an animal, or beating, hurting, or

killing an animal, depriving an animal of food, water, or shelter
from the weather, or abusing and/or causing an animal to suffer

43.

Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act, ANIMAL WELFARE INST.,

https://awionline.org/content/preventing-animal-cruelty-and-torture-pact-act

[https://perma.cc/T9JY-NMXG].
44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 48(c).
45. Laws that Protect Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/article/lawsthat-protect-animals/ [https://penna.cc/LZ6C-G33B].
46. See discussion infra pp. 10-22.
47. Although we note that four of these five states are ranked as "Top Tier" and one is
ranked as "Middle Tier" in the Animal Legal Defense Fund's 2018 U.S. Animal Protection Laws
State Rankings, this overview paints a more positive overall picture than a detailed analysis
would depict. For the rankings of all fifty states, see ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 2018 U.S.
ANIMAL PROTECTION LAWS STATE RANKINGS 7-8 (2018).

48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599b (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
49. Id. § 597a (Westlaw).
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in any way; 50 or
"

Maliciously and intentionally maiming, mutilating, or torturing a

reptile, bird, amphibian, mammal, or fish that is an endangered
'

or protected species. 5

A violation of any of these three offenses under Penal Code § 597 is
punishable as a felony by imprisonment for a maximum of three years, 52 or
by a fine of not more than $20,000, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 53
Alternately, a violation is punishable as a misdemeanor by imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $20,000,
or by both that fine and imprisonment. 54
b.

Texas

The principal legal prohibitions on animal cruelty in Texas are found in
the Texas Penal Code § 42.09, which prohibits cruelty to livestock, and
§ 42.092, which prohibits cruelty to non-livestock animals. For the purposes
of § 42.09, livestock animals are defined as "cattle, sheep, swine, goats,
ratites, or poultry commonly raised for human consumption;" "a horse, pony,
mule, donkey, or hinny;" "native or non-native hoofstock raised under
agriculture practices;" or "native or non-native fowl commonly raised under
agricultural practices." 5 5 This provision makes it an offense to treat a livestock
animal, intentionally or knowingly, in any of the following ways:
*

Torture;

*

Unreasonably fail to provide necessary food or care;

*

Abandon;

*

Transport or confine in a cruel and unusual manner;

*

Administer poison without the owner's consent (but note some
animals are excluded from this provision);

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Sess.).

Id. § 597b.
Id. § 597c.
Id. § 1170(h)(1).
Id. § 597d.
Id.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
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"

Cause a livestock animal to fight with another animal;

"

Use a livestock animal as live bait for training dogs;

"

Trip a horse; or

"

Seriously overwork a livestock animal.56

[VOL. 71: 385]

Offenses under the above subsections (2), (3), (4), or (9) are Class A
misdemeanors for the first offense, 57 for which the penalty is a fine not
exceeding $4,000, imprisonment for no more than a year, or both. 58 Offenses
under subsections (1), (5), (6), (7), or (8) are state jail felonies, 59 for which the
penalty is imprisonment for a maximum of two years and minimum of 180
days, and a fine of up to $10,000.60
Under Texas Penal Code

§ 42.092, it is an offense to treat non-livestock

animals, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, in a cruel manner. 61 For the
purposes of this provision, an "animal" is defined as "a domesticated living
creature, including any stray or feral cat or dog, and a wild living creature
previously captured." 62 Prohibited acts include the following:
"

Torturing an animal, or killing or causing serious bodily injury to
an animal in a cruel manner;

"

Without the owner's effective consent, killing, administering
poison to, or causing serious bodily injury to an animal;

"

Failing unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, care, or
shelter for an animal in the person's custody;

"

Abandoning unreasonably an animal in the person's custody;

"

Transporting or confining an animal in a cruel manner;

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 42.09(a)(1)-(9)

(Westlaw).

§ 42.09(c).
§ 12.21.
§ 42.09(c).
§ 12.35.
§ 42.092(b).
§ 42.092(a)(2).
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*

Without the owner's effective consent, causing bodily injury to
an animal;

*

Causing one animal to fight with another animal, if either animal
is not a dog;

*

Using a live animal as a lure in dog race training or in dog
coursing on a racetrack; or

*

Seriously overworking an animal. 63

397

An offense under the above subsections (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) is a Class

A misdemeanor for the first offense, 64 which is a fine not exceeding $4,000,
imprisonment for no more than a year, or both. 65 An offense under subsection
(1) or (2) is a felony of the third degree for the first offense, 66 which may result
in imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years and a minimum of two years, and
a fine of up to $10,000.67 An offense under subsection (7) or (8) is a state jail
felony for the first offense, 68 which may result in imprisonment for a

maximum of two years and minimum of 180 days, and a fine of up to
$10,000.69
The scope of these provisions is limited, given that they do not apply to a
range of other animals, including previously uncaptured wild animals, circus
animals, and animals for experimental use.
c.

Florida

In all of the laws in Florida that relate to animals, "animal" is defined as
"every living dumb creature." 7 0 The definition of "cruelty" in the same context
includes "every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable
pain or suffering is caused, except when done in the interest of medical
science, permitted, or allowed to continue when there is reasonable remedy or
relief."71

63. Id. § 42.092(b)(1)-(9).
64. Id. § 42.092(c).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. § 12.21.
Id. § 42.092(c-1).
Id. § 12.34.
Id. § 42.092(c-2).
Id. § 12.35(a)-(b).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.02 (West, Westlaw through 2019 First Reg. Sess.).
Id.
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§ 828.12 provides the primary legislative prohibition

against animal cruelty in Florida. Pursuant to subsection (1), a person who
"unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, torments, deprives of necessary
sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily mutilates, or kills any animal, or causes
the same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle, or otherwise, any animal
in a cruel or inhumane manner" commits the offense of animal cruelty. 72 This
is a misdemeanor of the first degree, 73 and is punishable by a maximum prison
sentence of one year, 74 a maximum fine of $5,000, or both. 75
Under § 828.12(2) of the Florida statute, a person who "intentionally
commits an act to any animal, or a person who owns or has the custody or
control of any animal and fails to act, which results in the cruel death, or
excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, or causes the
same to be done" commits the crime of aggravated animal cruelty. 76 This is a
felony of the third degree,77 and is punishable by a maximum prison sentence
of five years, 78 a fine of no more than $10,000, or both. 79
d.

New York

In New York, "animal" is defined in the Agriculture and Markets Law as

"every living creature except a human being," 8 0 and "torture" or "cruelty"
includes "every act, omission, or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain,
suffering or death is caused or permitted." m
Under Agriculture and Markets Law

§ 353, it is an offense to overload,

torture, unjustifiably injure or kill, deprive of necessary sustenance, or in any
way further an act of cruelty to any animal (wild or tame).8 2 A violation under
this section is a Class A misdemeanor, and attracts a maximum term of
imprisonment of one year,83 a fine of no more than $1,000,84 or both.8 5
A person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when "with no
justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. § 828.12(1) (Westlaw).
Id.
Id. § 775.082(4)(a).
Id. § 828.12(1).
Id. § 828.12(2).
Id.
Id. § 775.082(3)(e).
Id. § 828.12(2).
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350(1) (McKinney, Westlaw throughL.2019, ch. 74).
Id. § 350(2) (Westlaw).
Id. § 353.
Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 74).
N.Y. PENAL Law § 80.05(1) (Westlaw).
Id.
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physical injury to a companion animal with aggravated cruelty."86 For the
purposes of this section, "aggravated cruelty" is defined as "conduct which:
(i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is done or carried out in
an especially depraved or sadistic manner."? A violation of this provision is
a Class E felony and carries a penalty of a term of imprisonment of no more
than two years, and a fine of no more than $5,000.88
e.

Illinois

The Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act defines "animal" as "every
living creature, domestic or wild, but does not include man." 89 "Companion
animal" is defined as "an animal that is commonly considered to be, or is
considered by the owner to be, a pet . .. [it] includes, but is not limited to,
canines, felines, and equines." 90 It is a Class A misdemeanor under the Act to
"beat, cruelly treat, torment, starve, overwork or otherwise abuse any
animal," 91punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year and a fine
of no more than $2,500.92 Causing a companion animal to suffer serious injury
or death is a Class 4 felony punishable by up to three years of imprisonment
and a maximum fine of $25,000.93 The offender must have intentionally
committed the act. 94
Further, a person commits animal torture when he or she knowingly or
intentionally tortures an animal. 95 For the purposes of this provision, "torture"
means the "infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by
an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of the animal." 96
This is a Class 3 felony and carries a five-year maximum prison sentence and
a fine of up to $25,000.97

86. N.Y AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(1) (Westlaw).
87. Id. § 353-a(1).
88. Id. § 353-a(3); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.10(1)(b), 80.00(1)(a) (Westlaw).
89. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.01 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-592).
90. Id. 70/2.01(a) (Westlaw).
91. Id. 70/3.01(a), (d).
92. Id. 70/3.01(d); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-55(a), (e) (Westlaw).
93. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02(c) (Westlaw); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45 (a),
(e), -50(b) (Westlaw).
94. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02(a) (Westlaw).
95. Id. § 70/3.03(a).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 70/3.03(c); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-40(a), (e), -50(b) (Westlaw).
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Summary of CurrentAnimal Cruelty Criminal Offenses

As we have seen, animal cruelty is a criminal offense in each of the above
jurisdictions. Yet, while four of the five largest states in the United States have
adopted a broad definition of an animal in their legislation, Texas's approach
is notably narrow, as it excludes animals such as wild animals that have not
previously been captured, circus animals, and animals used in experiments. 98
Moreover, the law in these five states does not define animal cruelty in a
uniform way. Researchers have aptly observed, "conflicting state statutes and
negligent enforcement of animal cruelty laws show a lack of national
consensus on what constitutes animal cruelty." 99 Indeed, the legal definitions
of animal cruelty vary significantly between the jurisdictions. 00 Nevertheless,
a commonality between these laws is that the animal cruelty offenses they
create, focus on the infliction of physical pain on animals, though legislation
in New York and Florida also criminalizes "neglect" that causes an animal
"suffering," as distinct from "physical pain," which could encompass
emotional distress.101 The PACT Act reflects this shared focus on prohibiting
the infliction of physical pain by expanding animal crushing to include
"crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to
serious bodily injury," all of which relate to physical pain. 0 2 Sentences
available for animal cruelty offenses also vary between these states, and
include prison terms ranging from one to ten years, and fines from $1,000 to
$25,000.103 Some states rely on human-use typologies when ascribing

penalties.1 04 For example, although all of the surveyed states included felony
penalties for certain forms of animal cruelty, in New York, a felony penalty
is only applicable where the animal that has been subjected to cruelty is a
companion animal.1 05

98. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.09(a)(5), (d)-(f) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Reg. Sess.), and id. §§ 42.092(a)(2), (d)-(f) (Westlaw), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 597(e)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 870 of 2019 Reg. Sess.), and FLA. STAT. § 828.02 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 First Reg. Sess.), and 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.01 (Westlaw), andN.Y. AGRIC.
& MKTS. LAW § 350(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 74).
99. Hensley et al. supra note 10, at 498.
100. See supra Section II.B.1.
101. See id.
102. 18 U.S.C.A. § 48(f)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-72).
103. See id.
104. See Jessica Eisen, Liberating Animal Law: Breaking Free from Human-Use

Typologies, 17 ANIMAL L. 59, 60 (2010).
105. See supra Section II.B.1.d.
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Sentencing PracticesRegardingAnimal Cruelty Offenses

To contextualize the reform proposals in this Article further, we now
briefly set out some examples of how animal cruelty laws have been applied
in the five states mentioned above.
a.

California

While the case law in California indicates a willingness on the part of
California courts to impose relatively harsh sanctions on offenders who are
convicted of animal cruelty, there appears to be some selectivity in the
prosecutions that are brought to court. Many of the cases concern offenses that
have been committed against animals that are companion or at least nonlivestock animals. For example, in People v. Tom, the defendant, stabbed,
beat, strangled, and then attempted to burn the dead body of a dog belonging
to his girlfriend's parents.1 06 He was convicted under § 597(a) of the
California Penal Code and sentenced to an aggregate term of five years and
eight months in state prison.10 7 Similarly, in People v. Burnett, the defendant

intentionally threw a dog into oncoming lanes of traffic, resulting in the dog
being killed.1 08 He was found guilty of a violation of § 597(b) of the California
Penal Code and sentenced to three years in state prison.1 09 In another case, a
woman kept ninety-two cats in a trailer and failed to provide adequate care for
them, which led to the cats being dehydrated, malnourished, emaciated,
covered in urine and feces, and suffering from a number of additional
illnesses." 0 She was convicted of one count of animal cruelty under § 597(b)
of the California Penal Code and was sentenced to five years of formal
probation with a condition that she serve ninety-two days in county jail."'
While People v. Sanchez did relate to cruelty against farm animals, it did
not concern animals housed in large-scale animal production premises."1 2 In

the circumstances of this case, a man left his residence for weeks at a time,
leaving animals (including dogs, cows, rabbits, ducks, geese, and chickens)
caged or tied up without access to sufficient food or water in extremely hot
conditions." 3 He was convicted of seven counts of animal cruelty under §

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

People v. Tom, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 351-52 (Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 352.
People v. Bumett, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 123 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 125.
People v. Youngblood, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 777.
People v. Sanchez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
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597(b) of the California Penal Code and sentenced to state prison for a total
term of four years." 4
Some animal cruelty cases in California have related to animal fighting
offenses.

In People v.

Baniqued, the defendants

were involved

in

cockfighting, and tortured and killed roosters." 5 The defendants were
convicted of several counts of animal cruelty under §§ 597(a) and 597(b) of
the California Penal Code." 6 The Court imposed on each of the defendants
four years of formal probation and payment of various fines." 7 More recently,
the defendants in People v. Williams were each convicted of one felony count
of dogfighting and one felony count of animal cruelty, and they were each
sentenced to county jail for three years and eight months." 8 "The court
suspended execution of [the] sentence[s] and placed both defendants on five
years of formal probation on the condition that [the first defendant] serve 365
days in county jail, and [the second defendant] serve 270 days in county
jail."11 9 Both "defendants were ordered to take anti-animal cruelty classes and
were prohibited from owning or residing with any animals during the
probationary period."1 20
b.

Texas

A review of the case law in Texas indicates that there is a strong focus in
this state, too, on the prosecution of animal cruelty offenses that have been
committed against companion animals or at least non-livestock animals. For
example, in Justice v. State, the defendant was convicted of a single count of
cruelty to a non-livestock animal for filming his co-defendant torturing and
killing a newly weaned puppy.121 The sentence of the defendant to fifty years

114. Id. at 443. On appeal, six counts of the defendant's convictions were affirmed. See id.
at 448. Each violation is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of three years, or by
a fine of not more than $20,000, orby both fine and imprisonment. CAL. PENAL CODE § § 597(d),
1170(h) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 870 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
115. People v. Baniqued, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2000).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. People v. Williams, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 806, 814 (Ct. App. 2017). On appeal, the
defendants' convictions were affirmed. Id. at 819. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 597.5(a)(1), 597(b) (Westlaw) (codifying the felony of dogfighting and the felony of animal
cruelty).
119. 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 814.
120. Id.
121. Justice v. State, 532 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
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of imprisonment took into account his two prior felony convictions for
aggravated assault of a police officer.1 22

In 2015, in Amos v. State, the defendant was convicted of one count of
cruelty to a non-livestock animal under § 42.092(b) of the Texas Penal Code
after he beat a Shih Tzu dog to death with a broom.1 23 The "offense constituted
a state jail felony," but "the State enhanced his offense with a prior murder
conviction with an affinrmative deadly weapon finding, making the offense
punishable as a third-degree felony."1

24

The court sentenced him to thirty-one

months of imprisonment (out of a possible 120 months)1 25 in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.1 26 In another case in

the same year, a man who shot a stray dog with a crossbow was convicted of
the felony offense of animal cruelty under § 42.092(b)(1) of the Texas Penal
Code and sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment of two years.127
More recently, a man pleaded guilty to one count of cruelty to a non-livestock
animal after stabbing a dog with a knife, and he was sentenced to five years
of imprisonment. 128

In a different context, the owner of a non-profit cat sanctuary was
convicted of four counts of non-livestock animal cruelty under § 42.092(b)(1)
of the Texas Penal Code in 2011.129 The sanctuary housed over 200 cats, and

one employee was supposedly taking care of them.130 When animal control
officers entered the building of the sanctuary after receiving complaints, they
found feces and urine all over the floor and walls, twenty-seven dead cats
(some of whose bodies had been cannibalized by other cats), and cages with
cats inside who had no food or water. 131 The cats that were still alive had
various adverse health conditions, and were emaciated, terrified, and

122. Id. On appeal, the case was remanded for a new hearing on punishment only after
deleting the deadly weapon finding. Id. at 866. See generally Prichardv. State, 533 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (holding that a deadly weapon finding is disallowed when the victim is
nonhuman).
123. Amos v. State, 478 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The lower court's
decision was affirmed on appeal. Id at 773.
124. Id. at 767 n.1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 767.
127. Swilley v. State, 465 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The conviction was
affirmed on appeal. Id. at 797.
128. Galindo v. State, 564 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
129. Dixon v. State, 455 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Court of Appeals
of Texas affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 684.
130. Id. at 672.
131. Id. at 673-74.
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desperate for water. 3 2 The court placed the owner under community
supervision for five years on each charge, to be served concurrently.1 33
c.

Florida

Most of the cases determined in Florida that were reviewed also related
to companion animals and, in particular, dogs. In Brown v. State, for instance,

a woman was found guilty of felony cruelty to animals under § 828.12(2) of
the Florida Statute after a dog was "found near [her] mobile home, emaciated
and suffering" from several untreated long-term conditions.1 34 The District
Court of Florida held that the defendant owned the dog and had failed, "over
a period of more than one year, to provide adequate food, water, and medical
care" to it.1 35 The defendant was sentenced to six months of community
control, followed by three years of probation.1 36
More recently, however, the district court of appeals affirmed a
conviction for felony cruelty to animals where the defendant shot an opossum
"countless" times with a BB gun, and the animal needed to be euthanized as
a result. 3 7 The court noted that the felony cruelty offenses under § 828.12
create a "potential tension" between criminal conduct and lawful hunting.138
The commission of an act that causes a "cruel death" in § 828.12(2) applies
even to the unintended consequence of a lawful act like hunting. 139 The court
observed that this could be corrected "by amending the criminal statute to
require that the actor intend to cause the results that the statute seeks to
avoid-a cruel death or unnecessary pain or suffering.1"
d.

New York

The cases reviewed from New York also reflect an apparent focus on
prosecuting offenses relating to companion animals. For example, in People

v. Garcia, a man stomped to death a pet goldfish, and was convicted of
aggravated animal cruelty amongst other crimes (including assault, criminal
132. Id.
133. Id. at 672. This offense is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of ten years
and a fine of up to $10,000. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.35(c)(2)(B), 42.092(c) (West,
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
134. Brown v. State, 166 So. 3d 817, 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
135. Id. at 820.
136. Id. at 818.
137. Bartlett v. State, 929 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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possession of a weapon, and endangering the welfare of a child).141 He was
given an aggregate sentence of five and a half years to eleven years of
imprisonment for all of the offenses.1 42 In People v. Degiorgio, the defendant

picked up a dog by the neck, shook him, and slammed his head against a
door.1 43 The defendant then threw the dog down the basement stairs onto a
cement floor and kicked it.1 44 He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment
for aggravated cruelty to animals under § 353-a(1) of the Agriculture and
Markets Law.1 45
The case of People v. Richardson was concerned with animal fighting.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of felony animal fighting, one
count of misdemeanor animal fighting, and two counts of cruelty to
animals.1 46 Police found, among other things, a wounded dog in a cage,
numerous modified treadmills for use by dogs, blood on a water heater, and
dogfighting paraphernalia at the defendant's property. 147 In addition to the

paraphernalia, the defendant's dogs had extensive scarring and healing
consistent with dogfighting.1 48 The defendant was sentenced to a term of two
years and eight months to eight years of imprisonment.1 49
An exception to this trend of prosecuting cruelty towards companion
animals is the case of People v. Lohnes, where a man who broke into a barn
and stabbed a horse to death was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals
under § 353-a(1) of the Agriculture and Markets Law.1 50 The County Court
sentenced the defendant to imprisonment, imposed a fine, and ordered
payment of restitution.151

141. People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68, 73 (App. Div. 2006).
142. Id. at 73.
143. People v. Degiorgio, 827 N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (App. Div. 2007).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 343-44. A violation of this provision is a felony and carries a penalty of a term
of imprisonment of no more than two years. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(3) (McKinney,
Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 74).
146. People v. Richardson, 66 N.Y.S.3d 757, 758, 760 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (affirming
the defendant's convictions and sentence). See generally N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 351(2),
351(6), 353 (Westlaw) (codifying felony animal fighting, misdemeanor animal fighting, and
cruelty to animals as criminal offenses).
147. 66 N.Y.S.3d at 758.
148. Id. at 760.
149. Katie Alexander, ConvictedAnimal Abuser Sentenced to up to Eight Years in Prison,
WIVB4 (Sep. 1, 2015), https://www.wivb.com/news/local-news/convicted-animal-abusersentenced-to-up-to-eight-years-in-prison/ [https://penna.cc/TGU2-BKWX].
150. People v. Lohnes, 976 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
151. Id. at 721.
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Illinois

Illinois case law relating to animal cruelty offenses also focuses on
offenses against companion dogs. In 2008, a woman placed a towing chain

around the neck of her pit bull dog, which caused a large, gaping hole to form
in the dog's neck and resulted in the dog being euthanized. 5 2 She was found
guilty of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal under § 3.02 of the
Humane Care for Animals Act and sentenced to thirty months of probation.1 53
In People v. Robards, the defendant appealed her conviction for two counts

of aggravated animal cruelty under § 3.02(a) of the Humane Care for Animals
Act after her two dogs were discovered dead in her previous home.15 4 The
dogs were emaciated and dehydrated.155 The defendant had moved out of that
house and into another property.1 56 Her landlord discovered a dog's emaciated
body on the living room floor, and police later discovered the other dog's body
in a garbage bag in the bedroom.1 57 The defendant was sentenced to twelve

months of probation.158 On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor
failed to prove that she intended to cause serious injury or death to the dogs.159
The appellate court rejected her argument and held that, for conviction, it is
only necessary that the act itself was intentional, and it caused the death or
serious injury of an animal.1 60 The court further noted that the defendant was
"very fortunate to have only received a sentence of twelve months of
probation for these heinous crimes," and criticized the lower court for its
"unjustly and inexplicably lenient" sentence, simply because the defendant
caused harm to an animal and not to a human being.161

152. People v. Land, 955 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District, Sixth Division affirmed the convictions. Id. at 541.
153. Id. at 541. The offense is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of six years
and a maximum fine of $25,000. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A.
101-592); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45(a), (e) (Westlaw); id. 5/5-4.5-50(b).
154. People v. Robards, 97 N.E.3d 600, 601 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
155. Id. at 602.
156. Id. at 601.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 602.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 604.
161. Id. at 604-05.
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Summary of CurrentPracticein Prosecutingand Convicting Cruelty

to Animals
Thus, a review of the case law in the five largest states indicates that it is
primarily offenses that are committed against companion animals and some
non-livestock animals that are tried in court. Further, while some courts have
shown a willingness to impose relatively heavy penalties on animal cruelty
offenders, other offenders have received lenient sentences, which do not even
include a short period of incarceration.1 62 Notably, there is no consistency or
uniformity regarding the penalties that have been imposed on animal cruelty
offenders and the sentences for such offenses vary markedly.1 63 Particularly
illuminating for the purposes of this Article is the fact that there is no
developed jurisprudence regarding or coherent approach to the sentencing of
animal cruelty offenders.1 64
III.

OBJECTIVES

AND PRINCIPLES FOR SENTENCING

ANIMAL

CRUELTY

OFFENDERS

As we have seen, there is a range of animal cruelty criminal offenses in
all American jurisdictions. Yet, although relatively stern maximum penalties
apply to those crimes, there is a lack of consistency in sentencing practice.1 65
In order to evaluate the soundness of the current approach to sentencing
animal cruelty offenders, it is necessary to examine the key objectives and
principles that at present do, but also should, determine penalty severity. As
we explain below, we argue that the principle of proportionality should be the
major consideration for courts that are sentencing offenders for committing
animal cruelty crimes.
Various sentencing objectives currently influence courts' determination
of the severity of the penalties that are imposed. The key sentencing aims are
community protection, general deterrence and specific deterrence, and
rehabilitation. 166 In a model sentencing system, however, only the objectives
of community protection and rehabilitation should have, to a limited extent,
an impact on the sanctions that they impose on animal cruelty offenders.

162. See supra Section II.C.1.
163. See supra Section II.C.1.
164. See supra Section II.C.1.
165. See supra Section II.C.1.
166. Mirko Bagaric et al., Mitigating America's Mass Incarceration Crisis Without
Compromising Community Protection:Expanding the Role of Rehabilitationin Sentencing, 22
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 33 (2018).
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GeneralDeterrence and Specific Deterrence

Although the objectives of general deterrence and specific deterrence
operate to increase penalty severity, empirical evidence demonstrates that
neither is efficacious in practice. There is a very small correlation between the
imposition of harsher penalties and reduced commission of crimes.167 The
most effective means of lowering the crime rate is simply to make would-be
offenders believe that, if they offend, they will be apprehended.1 68
Consequently, the goal of general deterrence cannot be used to justify setting
harsh penalties. A recent analysis of the incarceration rate of drug offenders
and the distribution and use of illicit drugs illustrates the ineffectiveness of
general deterrence.1 69 A PEW Research Report in March 2018 noted that high

levels of imprisonment for drug offenses do not reduce drug use or drug
arrests. 7 0

The objective of specific deterrence aims to discourage offending by
individual offenders (rather than the community in general).' 7' It is premised
on the assumption that harsh penalties will teach offenders a lesson and
discourage them from reoffending. Yet empirical data shows that this
presumption, too, is flawed.1 72 Harsh penalties in the form of prison terms, in
fact, seem to have a slight criminogenic effect-they can increase the
likelihood of reoffending. 7 3 Thus, the objectives of general deterrence and
specific deterrence should not influence the sentencing of animal cruelty
offenders.

&

167. See Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence:Deja Vu
All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 327-28 (2005); Dale O. Cloninger
Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment,
33 APPLIED ECON. 569, 574-75 (2001); Doob & Webster supra note 7, at 143-45; Steven D.
Levitt, UnderstandingWhy Crime Fell in the 1990s: FourFactorsthatExplain the Decline and

Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178 (2004); Paul R. Zimnerman, State Executions,
Deterrence, and the Incidence ofMurder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 187-88 (2004).

168. See Bagaric supra note 11, at 402, 405-11.
169. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, MORE IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT REDUCE STATE
DRUG PROBLEMS 5 (2018).

170. Id.
171. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115,
124 (2009).
172. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, UsingRandom JudgeAssignments to Estimate
the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders,
48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 382 (2010).
173. See id. at 382-83; DONALD RITCHIE, DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE 18, 21 (2011); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, REP. NO. 139,
SENTENCING 3 (2013); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 245 (1973); Don Weatherburn et al., The Specific Deterrent
Effect of CustodialPenalties on Juvenile Re-Offending, CRIME & JUST. BULL., July 2009, at 5.
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Community Protection

The main manner in which the objective of community protection has
been most vigorously pursued is by incapacitating offenders through
imprisoning them. This confinement ensures that offenders cannot commit
crimes in the community during the period of their sentences. The efficacy of
imprisonment is, however, undermined in some situations by the fact that its
financial cost can outweigh the benefit associated with preventing the
commission of minor criminal acts, especially property, immigration, and
low-level drug offenses. 7 4 Empirical data thus suggests that the sanction of

imprisonment should be reserved for offenders who commit serious violent
and sexual offenses.17 5

Ostensibly, the goal of community protection relates only to the
protection of humans and hence would seem to be inapplicable to violence
committed against animals. However, viewed more broadly, one could argue
that some animal cruelty offenders do endanger the human community.
Indeed, researchers Christopher Hensley, John Browne, and Caleb Trentham
observe that "ignoring" human cruelty towards animals "may have
devastating repercussions" not just for animals, but also for people. 7 6 There
are several reasons for this. Cruelty towards animals lowers the moral tone of
society. Abuse of pets can constitute a form of domestic violence if it causes
family members distress, and the concern of victims of domestic violence for
their pets' welfare may prevent them from seeking refuge.17 7 The American
Psychiatric Association has listed animal cruelty as a symptom of conduct
disorder, a condition involving behavior that violates others' rights and social
norms.?

Especially significant is an apparent association between cruelty

towards animals and commission of crimes against humans: individuals who
are cruel to animals may either concurrently or subsequently engage in
behavior that harms people. 179

For many years, philosophers, academics, and animal welfare rights
groups conjectured that there was a link between cruelty towards animals and

174.
175.
176.
177.

See Bagaric, supra note 11, at 401-02.
See id. at 410-11.
Hensley et al., supra note 10, at 498.
Frank R. Ascione et al., Battered Pets and Domestic Violence: Animal Abuse

Reported by

Women

Experiencing Intimate Violence

and by Nonabused Women,

13

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 354, 355, 364 (2007).
178. Mark R. Dadds et al., AssociationsAmong Cruelty to Animals, Family Conflict, and
Psychopathic Traits in Childhood, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 411-12 (2006).
179. See Ascione et al., supra note 177, at 355; Hensley et al., supra note 10.
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interpersonal violence in particular.1 80 Researchers have now tested and found
empirical evidence to substantiate two theories regarding this connection: (i)
the "graduation" or "progression" thesis; and (ii) the "deviance generalization
hypothesis."181 We now explain and discuss the evidentiary support for each
of these theories in turn.
According to the progression thesis, an individual's cruelty towards
animals in childhood can precipitate their commission of offenses against
humans in later life.'8 2 Therefore, individuals who are cruel to animals are
subsequently more likely to behave aggressively towards other people, and
those who behave aggressively towards other people are more likely than
those who do not to have been cruel to animals previously. 83 It had been
observed for some time that many serial killers had behaved cruelly to animals
in their early lives. 84 Initial studies of the progression thesis nonetheless
yielded varied results, though the inconsistencies were seemingly attributable
to differences between and limitations of the methodologies used. 85 More
recent studies, using varied means of data collection (including self-report
surveys, interviews, and case studies) and examining recurrent offenses, have
confirmed a strong link between several acts of cruelty towards animals in

&

180. Piers Beirne, FromAnimal Abuse to Interhuman Violence? A CriticalReview ofthe
Progression Thesis, 12 SOC'Y & ANIMALS 39, 39-40 (2004); Dadds et al., supra note 178, at
412.
181. C. Longobardi & L. Badenes-Ribera, The Relationship Between Animal Cruelty in
Children andAdolescent andInterpersonalViolence: A Systematic Review, 46 AGGRESSION
VIOLENT BEHAV. 201, 202 (2019).
182. See id; Beirne, supra note 180, at 40.
183. See Beirne, supra note 180, at 46.
184. See Linda Merz-Perez et al., Childhood Cruelty to Animals and Subsequent Violence
Against Humans, 45 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 556, 569 (2001);
Hensley et al., supra note 10, at 489.
185. For instance, in 1987, A. Felthous and S. Kellert published the results of their metaanalysis of fifteen studies of the association between childhood animal cruelty and adult
interpersonal violence: five studies found a clear link between them, while ten did not.
Nevertheless, the five studies used direct interviews, while the other ten used chart reviews.
Further, the five studies defined the terms "animal cruelty" and "personal aggression" and used
"recurrent acts of animal cruelty" and personal aggression, whereas the other ten did not define
behaviors, and "used one act of animal abuse as animal cruelty" and "one act of violence to
humans as personal aggression." See Christopher Hensley et al., The Predictive Value of
Childhood Cruelty Methods on LaterAdult Violence: Examining Demographicand Situational
Correlates, 56

INT'L J.

OFFENDER THERAPY &

COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 281,

282

(2012);

Longobardi & Badenes-Ribera, supra note 181, at 202. In 2004, Piers Beime claimed that the
progression thesis was unsupported by empirical evidence given the lack of government and
police-based data on animal abuse and prospective, longitudinal studies of this theory. See
Beirne, supra note 180, at 41, 52-53. While such studies would undoubtedly be useful,
subsequent studies have substantiated earlier research regarding this connection. See Hensley et
al., supra, at 287.
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childhood and subsequent aggressive behavior in adulthood.1 86 Consequently,
it is clear that those who have behaved cruelly towards animals during
childhood are at greater risk of committing violent offenses against people in

later life. 187
Some significant studies illustrate this connection. In 2001, Linda Merz-

Perez, Kathleen Heide, and Ira Silverman published the results of their study
of forty-five violent and forty-five nonviolent Florida prisoners, which drew
on a wide range of data about them. 88 They found that offenders who
committed violent crimes as adults were substantially more likely than those
who committed nonviolent offenses to have committed acts of cruelty against
animals as children (56% compared with 20%).189 The former group also
tended to commit acts of cruelty towards animals that involved physical
contact with them, and less of the violent offenders than the nonviolent
offenders expressed remorse for this behavior.1 90 A publication in 2012 by
Christopher Hensley, Suzanne Tallichet, and Erik Dutkiewicz following a
study of 180 male prison inmates in a southern state, which focused on
different forms of animal cruelty committed during childhood, revealed that
103 of the participants reported having engaged in animal cruelty.191 Those

who admitted to committing multiple acts of animal cruelty during childhood
were more likely to have committed violent acts against humans as adults, and
those who had engaged in bestiality (sex with animals) during childhood were
particularly likely to have committed violent crimes in adulthood.1 92
In 2019, C. Longobardi and L. Badenes-Ribera published a systematic
review of thirty-two studies that had been undertaken between 1995 and 2017,

and investigated the relationship between animal cruelty committed during
childhood and adolescence, and later interpersonal violence.1 93 Retrospective
studies of prisoners confirmed that "acts of animal cruelty committed during
childhood and adolescence are a relatively persistent predictor of adult
interpersonal violence," and prospective studies similarly found that "animal
cruelty precedes [violent and nonviolent] offenses."1 94 Prisoners who
committed recurrent acts of childhood animal cruelty, and especially
drowning animals or engaging in sexual acts with them, were more likely to
186. See Hensley et al., supra note 10, at 491; Hensley et al., supra note 185, at 293.
187. See Anne M. Volant et al., The RelationshipBetween Domestic Violence andAnimal
Abuse: An Australian Study, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 15 (2008).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Merz-Perez et al., supra note 184, at 558-60.
Id. at 561, 570.
Id. at 564, 567-68.
Hensley et al., supra note 185, at 285, 287.
See id. at 287-93.
Longobardi & Badenes-Ribera, supra note 181, at 202-03.
Id. at 208-09.
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have engaged in repeated acts of interpersonal violence as adults, even after
controlling for demographic and other factors.1 95
According to the deviance generalization hypothesis, individuals who are
cruel to animals are likely also to engage in other violent and nonviolent
criminal behavior.1 96 Reasons postulated for this are that involvement in one
form of deviant behavior leads to involvement in others, and these behaviors
are motivated by the same factors.1 97 Longobardi's research also found
empirical support for this theory and particularly that more serious offenses
are often committed in addition to animal cruelty, including among nonprisoners, especially where recurrent acts of animal cruelty are committed.1 98
Considerable research has demonstrated that abuse of pets in particular
often coexists in families that are afflicted by domestic violence.1 99 Several
studies found that a high proportion of women who sought refuge from
domestic violence in various programs and refuges reported that their pets had
also been abused in their homes. 200 Indeed, research conducted in the United
States, including by Frank Ascione and others, found that women in domestic
violence shelters were nearly eleven times more likely to report that their
partner had hurt or killed their pets than a comparison group of women who
had not experienced intimate violence. 20' The results of an Australian study
reported in 2008 are consistent with this co-occurrence of animal abuse and
interpersonal violence amongst adults: 20 2 the reported rate of partner pet abuse
among women who had experienced domestic violence was 52.9%, compared
to

0% among a group of women who had not experienced domestic violence

reported pet abuse. 20 3
In light of the link between animal cruelty offenses and offenses that
inflict harm on people, the objective of community protection should, to some
extent inform the sentencing of animal cruelty offenders.
C. Rehabilitation
The sentencing objective of rehabilitation is generally invoked to mitigate
penalty where an offender demonstrates that he or she is reformed since

195. Id.
196. Id. at 202.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 207-08.
199. See Ascione et al., supra note 177, at 355; Beirne, supra note 180, at 41-42.
200. See Ascione et al, supra note 177, at 356-58; Volant et al., supra note 187, at 2.
201. Ascione et al., supra note 177, at 365.
202. Volant et al., supra note 187, at 15.
203. See id. at 5-6, 7, 9, 12.
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committing the relevant crime, 20 4 and has no or few prior convictions.
Providing that such evidence is produced, it would be reasonable for this goal
to have an impact on the penalty that is imposed for animal cruelty offenses.
D. Proportionality

As noted above, we consider that the key principle that should influence
the sentencing of animal cruelty offenders is proportionality. In its broadest
expression, proportionality is a doctrine that stipulates that there must be
compatibility between an act or objective and the means employed to achieve
it.205 It acts as a restraint on the measures that can be taken to achieve desired
outcomes. The proportionality principle strikes a strong intuitive chord and,

probably, for this reason, is applied in many areas of the law. As Richard G.
Fox notes, the notion that the "response must be commensurate to the harm
caused, or sought to be prevented," is at the core of the criminal defenses of
self-defense and provocation. 206 It is also the foundation of civil law damages
for injury or death, which aims to compensate for the actual loss suffered, and
equitable remedies in common law countries, which are "proportional to the
detriment sought to be avoided." 207

The justification for the proportionality principle is that benefits and
burdens should be distributed with regard to, and be commensurate with, a
person's merit or blame. 208 Such a division of benefits and burdens ensures
that our society is just and fair. If benefits and burdens were randomly
distributed, we would have little motivation to strive hard to succeed or to
avoid engaging in harmful conduct. The principle of proportionality is

particularly applicable in the area of sentencing, where it entails that the
severity of the punishment, and thus the hardship imposed on the offender,
must match the seriousness of the crime. 209

Proportionality in sentencing is widely endorsed and embraced. It is a
requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten states in the United States. 210

204. See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

7 n.1, 8 (1987) (describing that an offender has undergone rehabilitation if he stops committing
crime after serving a sentence because he now believes that the criminal behavior is wrong).
205. Richard G. Fox, The Meaning ofProportionalityin Sentencing, 19 MELBOURNE U.
L. REV. 489, 490 (1994).
206. Id. at 491.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 154 (2009); see

also Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIz. L. REV. 241
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Proportionality is also a core principle that informs (though it does not
strongly influence) the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 211 In addition, as a
survey of state sentencing law by Thomas Sullivan and Richard Frase
demonstrates, at least nine states have constitutional provisions relating to the
prohibition of excessive penalties or treatment (which reflect an endorsement
of proportionality), 212 and twenty-two states have constitutional clauses that
prohibit cruel and unusual penalties, including eight states with a
proportionate-penalty clause. 213
The contours of the proportionality principle are unclear. Scholars have
observed that there is no stable and clear manner in which the hardship of the
punishment can be matched to the severity of the crime. 214 However, it is
widely accepted that the most important indicator of the seriousness of an
offense is the suffering or pain that it has caused. 215 Behavior that does not
cause any physical suffering may nonetheless still indicate the gravity of the
offense if it infringes social norms or induces psychological or emotional
suffering, for instance, by causing an individual shame, embarrassment, or
indignation. 216 Examples of this type of conduct, which is punishable by
criminal sanctions, include spitting in public and distributing photographs of
nude people.
In applying the principle of proportionality in sentencing for animal

cruelty crimes, it will be important for courts to consider whether such
offending is more serious and thus warrants the imposition of a harsher
sanction if it results in the animal's death. The most serious offense that
humans can commit against one another is homicide, so application of the
principle of proportionality in sentencing an offender for this crime would
result in a relatively severe sanction being imposed. Yet, given that humans
slaughter such a high volume of animals for food and many animals, such as
ants and flies, have minimal cognitive capacity, it would be contrary to current
social norms for a sanction to be imposed simply for killing an animal. Indeed,
the notion that animals' lives are as sacred as those of humans does not align
with popular contemporary normative values. One of the major arguments that
(2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois, Oregon, Washington, and West
Virginia).
211. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2018).

212. SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 210, at 154-55.
213. Id. at 154.
214. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL
INVESTIGATION 184 (2004).

215. See id.
216. See id. at 61 (discussing that a crime may affect dimensions other than a person's
physical integrity, such as his or her freedom from humiliation).
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has been raised in debates regarding euthanasia and abortion of humans is that
they do not take into account the sanctity of life. 217 It is unlikely, at least in

the near future, that such a position would be taken in relation to animals,
especially because they constitute a staple of many people's diets.
Nevertheless, where human cruelty towards an animal results in its death,
we consider that this fact could aggravate the offense if the animal is
conscious of its ongoing existence; has a preference for living; the animal's
death also causes suffering to a human; the animal's death causes suffering to
another animal who depended on the animal that was killed; or all of the
above. This is consistent with the two major rationales for imposing a harsher
sanction if an act of violence against a person causes his or her death. First,
human beings as a species generally exhibit an understanding of their ongoing
existence and the concept of the future. 218 Thus, in considering the seriousness
of a violent act that is committed against a human, conduct that eliminates that
expectation of a future has the impact of aggravating the offense. While some
humans, such as infants and the severely mentally disabled, may not be
capable of such understanding, it would be socially unacceptable to
discriminate against them in sentencing violent offenders for crimes
committed against them. Second, violent crime that results in human death
can also cause suffering to other humans (and animals), including those that
depend on them.
Many animal species do display an awareness of their own existence and
expectation of their future existence. 219 Charles Darwin famously observed in
his Descent of Man, "the difference in mind between man and the higher

animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind." 220 Ed
Wasserman, a researcher from the University of Iowa, would agree. He has
commented:
The notion that there might only be a quantitative-not a
qualitative-disparity between human and animal intelligence may
make people uneasy . . . [however] [t]he evidence that we collect
constantly surprises us, suggesting that we're not alone in many of

these cognitive abilities. [So] [w]hy we would believe that humans
alone have such capabilities is a peculiar and unfortunate arrogance.
217. See KUMAR AMARASEKARA & MIRKO BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND

THE LAW 55-56 (2002).
218. See id. at 59 (discussing that humans respect the value of their own lives).
219. See generally Colin Allen & Michael Trestman, Animal Consciousness, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 24, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/
[https://perma.cc/FRB5-CDME] (exploring self-awareness and the ability to plan for the future
in various species of animals).
220. CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN
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That's one reason why I enjoy studying animals; the smarter we
discover them to be, the more humble we should be. 221
Although scientists do not fully understand animals' cognitive capacities,
they have observed that certain animals have a degree of self-awareness, are
conscious of their ongoing existence, and therefore have a preference for
living over dying. 222 This is evident from studies that have shown that
monkeys (Mucaca mulatta), chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, elephants,
and dolphins recognize themselves from their reflections in mirrors. 223 In
these studies, researchers painted these marks on the animals while they were
unconscious and, when they woke up, they were given mirrors, which the
animals used to examine themselves and locate the marks. 224 These animals'
capacity for self-recognition indicates that they are aware that they are
independent beings and, by extension, that other beings have their own
identities, too. 225

Experiments conducted by comparative psychologist, Dr. David Smith, 226
demonstrated that some animals are even capable of metacognition, which is
the capacity to think about thinking and have an awareness of one's own
mental states. 227 In particular, dolphins and macaque monkeys showed that
they were capable of experiencing uncertainty and reacting accordingly
(whereas pigeons did not display this capacity). 228 In other experiments with

apes and chimpanzees, these animals engaged in behavior that appears to
demonstrate that they expect the order of future events and are aware of
themselves being "distinct entities" existing over time. 229 Thus, for animals
that are conscious of their existence and that exhibit an expectation of their

221. Univ. of Iowa, Baboons And Pigeons Are Capable Of Higher-Level Cognition,
Behavioral Studies Show, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2009/02/090212141143.hum [https://penna.cc/JZ3W-Y242].
222. See generally Allen & Trestman, supra note 219 (exploring different studies that
indicate an animal's sense of awareness and self-consciousness).
223. See Allen & Trestman, supra note 219 (summarizing a collection of mirror studies
completed with a variety of animals); Abigail Z. Rajala et al., Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
Do Recognize Themselves in the Mirror: Implicationsfor the Evolution of Self-Recognition,
5 PLOS ONE
1,
1(2010),
https://joumals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371
/journal.pone.0012865&type=printable [https://perma.cc/RT2W-5BWG].
224. Rajala et al., supra note 223.
225. See id.
226. J. David Smith, The Study ofAnimalMetacognition, 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 389
(2009).
227. See id. at 389.
228. See id. at 389, 391, 394.
229. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 110-17 (2d ed. 1991).
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future existence, a harsher sanction should apply to crimes against them that
result in their death than would otherwise be imposed for such offenses.
As noted above, in relation to other animals who do not exhibit this
consciousness of their own existence and preference for remaining alive, we
maintain that the death of such animals as a consequence of human cruelty
would only aggravate the severity of the offense where their death causes
suffering to humans or to other animals that depend on them. This is because,
to the extent that there is no evidence that the animal has such awareness, one
of the primary rationales for considering death to be an aggravating factor no
longer applies. Nevertheless, if the animal is the pet of a human, their death
could cause the owner significant distress. Many pet owners regard their pets

as members of their families and even "surrogate relatives," and depend on
them for companionship and enjoyment. 230 Research has shown that people's
relationships with their pets can be "critical in determining [their] mental
equilibrium" and pets can "play a positive psychosocial role in the home,"
especially for people who live alone. 231 There is substantial evidence that, as
a consequence, the death of a pet can be an extremely traumatic event for their
human owner and mirror a person's experience of the death of a human
partner or other relative. 232 Gerald Gosse and Michael Barnes published the
results of their study that measured the bereavement levels of 207 adults from
New York, whose pet dogs or cats had died in the year before participating in
this research. 233 They found that "high attachment [to the pet], low social
support and an accumulation of other stressful events would be associated
with high levels of grief," and certain "bereaved pet owners" may in fact "be
predisposed toward social isolation." 23 4 Kenneth Keddie also documented the
"disabling psychiatric symptoms" and "pathological grief" that three women
suffered following the deaths of their pet dogs. 235
The death of an animal owing to human cruelty might also increase the
gravity of the offense and warrant the imposition of a harsher sanction if it
causes physical or psychological pain to or the death of another animal that
depended on the deceased animal. This would occur most typically when the
killed animal has offspring who suffer, for example, by starving, because of
their parent's death.

230. Gerald H. Gosse & Michael J. Barnes, Human GriefResultingfrom the Death of a
Pet, 7 ANTHROZOOS 103, 103 (1994); Kenneth M. G. Keddie, PathologicalMourningAfter the
Death ofa Domestic Pet, 131 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 21, 22 (1977).
231. Keddie, supra note 230, at 21.
232. Gosse & Bames, supra note 230.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 110.
235. Keddie, supra note 230, at 21.

Published by Scholar Commons,

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

418

[VOL. 71: 385]

For the purpose of applying the proportionality principle, three matters,

in particular, indicate that human cruelty towards animals is extremely serious
and warrants the imposition of harsh sanctions. First, as we shall see below,
scientific investigation has established that certain animals feel physical pain
and that there is no relevant distinction between the physical pain sensations
experienced by animals and humans. 23 6 Scientific research has confirmed that
animals can also experience psychological harm. 23 7 Second, according to
current social norms, it is inappropriate for humans to cause animals to unduly
suffer pain. 238 Third (and in part due to scientific evidence that cruelty towards
some animals can cause them to experience pain), 239 pursuant to the two major
streams of moral philosophy, certain animals have moral standing.
Consequently, it is unethical to cause them to suffer unnecessarily, and it is
essential for the law to protect them.
We now examine in greater detail these considerations, which we argue
should inform both the classification of animal cruelty offenses and
sentencing of them.
IV. MATTERS THAT SHOULD INFORM CLASSIFICATION AND SENTENCING OF
ANIMAL CRUELTY OFFENSES

As noted above, in this part of the Article, we consider scientific,
normative, and philosophical bases for penalizing cruelty towards animals
and, especially in respect of scientific evidence, determining the gravity of
this offending. We begin by reviewing the scientific research concerning
animals' capacity to feel pain. We then consider social norms regarding
human interaction with animals. Finally, we examine moral theories that
establish that, in light of scientific evidence and social norms, animals have
moral standing.
A.

Scientific Research RegardingAnimals' Capacity to Feel Pain

A compelling reason for punishing offenders who behave cruelly towards
others is the desire to eliminate or reduce pain. Yet it has been difficult for
scientists to prove conclusively that animals in fact experience pain because
there is no universal, incontrovertible, objective measure for detecting and
evaluating pain, even in humans; pain is a subjective experience for any living

creature; and animals do not necessarily express pain in similar ways to
236.
237.
238.
239.

See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra
infra
infra
infra

Section IV.A.1.
Section IV.A.2.
Section IV.B.
Section IV.C.
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humans. 240 Recent scientific evidence does nonetheless confirm that many
animals do feel physical pain and that it resembles the pain that humans
experience. 241 There is also scientific evidence that at least some animals
experience psychological suffering. 242 We argue that this research indicates
the impact on animals of cruelty offenses and thus should affect the law
regarding them, including how the principle of proportionality is applied to
assess the gravity of the offending and determine fitting sanctions for these
crimes.

We now discuss this research, first regarding animals' experience of
physical pain and then concerning their psychological suffering.
1.

Animals' Experience of PhysicalPain

As animals do not communicate and convey any pain that they might
experience in the same manner as humans, it is difficult for people to
recognize whether animals, in fact, suffer from pain. Nevertheless, scientists
have developed three approaches to evaluate whether animals experience
pain, all of which rely on their observations of animals. These methods are
anthropomorphic, 243 as they examine whether animals experience similar
physiological and behavioral reactions to pain as humans. The first method
involves measuring animals' bodily functions (such as their consumption of
food and water); the second entails evaluating their physiological responses
(specifically by examining the concentrations of plasma cortisol in their
bodies); and the third encompasses assessment of animals' behavior (which
might include matters such as their vocalization and physical movements). 244

240. See Hope Ferdowsian & Debra Merskin, Parallels in Sources of Trauma, Pain,
Distress, and Suffering in Humans and Nonhuman Animals, 13 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION
448, 449 (2012).
241. Id. at 461.
242. See, e.g., McMillan et al., Characteristicsof Canine Victims, supra note 14;
McMillan, Outcomesfor Dogs, supra note 14.
243. "Anthropomorphism" is the term used to describe the practice of humans imposing
human characteristics on their perception of animals and their behavior. Examples of
anthropomorphic conduct are (i) a human pet "owner" referring to their pet cat's paws as
"hands"; (ii) if the pet cat becomes a little aggressive when being fed, their human owner may
say "mind your manners Doris!" (Doris being the name of the human's pet cat); or (iii) a human
medical researcher thinking a research animal (like a mouse) is not feeling pain whilst the
researcher is performing a certain procedure on that animal because the researcher feels that any
human patient would not feel pain during such a procedure.
244. Daniel M. Weary et al., Identifying and Preventing Pain in Animals, 100 APPLIED
ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 64, 65 (2006).
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Scientists have gleaned, particularly from application of the third measure,
that many animals do feel physical pain. 245

Specifically, scientists have interpreted from the fact that many species of
animals and especially mammals, primates, and vertebrates (though some
invertebrates, too) exhibit similar behavioral reactions to pain stimuli as
humans-such as screaming or thrashing about in response to a physical
attack-that they share humans' physical system for recording pain, which is
described as "nociception."

246

Scientists believe that certain animals, like

humans, have nociceptors, which are nerve ends, in various parts of their
bodies. 247 Nociceptors receive a message of potential pain or noxious stimuli,

and transmit this message through the spinal cord to the brain, whose sensory
cortex processes it and in turn forwards the message to other parts of the body
that exhibit pain symptoms, for instance, through vocalization or

movement. 248 Animals whom scientists have found display these responses to
physical pain are vertebrates, such as guinea pigs, 249 rats, 25 0 horses, 251 and
farm animals, including chickens, cows, and sheep. 25 2 Perhaps surprisingly,
245. Id. at 69.
246. Lynne U.
Sneddon,
Can Animals Feel Pain, WELLCOME
TRUST,
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/culture2.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2012
0413122654/http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/culture2. html].
247. David DeGrazia & Andrew Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and
Humans, 12 THEORETICAL MED. 193, 197 (1991).
248. See id. at 197-98.
249. Hilde Venneirsch et al., Evaluation of Pain Behavior and Bone Destruction in Two
Arthritic Models in Guinea Pig and Rat, 87 PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 349,
357 (2007).
250. John V. Roughan & Paul A. Flecknell, Evaluation of a Short Duration BehaviourBased Post-OperativePain Scoring System in Rats, 7 EUR. J. PAIN 397, 405 (2005).
251. Johannes P.A.M. van Loon et al., Application of a Composite Pain Scale to
Objectively Monitor Horses with Somatic and Visceral Pain Under Hospital Conditions, 30 J.
EQUINE VETERINARY SCI. 641, 641 (2010); see P.D. McGreevy, Guest Editorial, The Fine Line
Between Pressure andPain: Ask the Horse, 188 VETERINARY J. 250, 250 (2011).

252. See M.J. Gentle, AttentionalShifts Alter Pain Perception in the Chicken, 10 ANIMAL
WELFARE S187, S192 (Supp. 2001), discussed in Weary et al., supra note 244, at 73; see also
Andrew D. Fisher, Addressing Pain Caused by Mulesing in Sheep, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL
BEHAV. SCI. 232, 232 (2011) (indicating pain in sheep caused by mulesing procedure); S. Lomax
et al., Use of Local Anaesthesia for Pain Management During Husbandry Procedures in

Australian Sheep Flocks, 86 SMALL RUMINANT RES. 56, 56 (2009) (finding pain in lambs
caused by mulesing, castration, tail-docking, and ear-knotching procedures); K.M.D.
Rutherford, Assessing Pain in Animals, 11 ANIMAL WELFARE 31, 36 (2002) (describing
behavioral responses to pain in steers after branding and in calves after castration); Kevin J.
Stafford & David J. Mellor, Addressing the PainAssociatedwith Disbuddingand Dehorningin
Cattle, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCL 226, 226 (2011) (observing pain in cattle caused by
disbudding and dehorning procedures); Ignacio Vinuela-Femandez et al., PainMechanisms and
Their Implication for the Management of Pain in Farm and Companion Animals, 174
VETERINARY J. 227, 231 (2007) (indicating ability of farm animals to feel pain); Kristen A.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss2/8

36

Bagaric et al.: A Rational Approach to Sentencing Offenders for Animal Cruelty: A
2019]

PROPORTIONATE PENALTIES FOR ANIMAL CRUELTY

421

scientists have found that even some invertebrates, including leeches,
crustaceans, and sea slugs, also have nociceptors, while fish have sensory
neurons that can similarly detect sources of pain. 253 Observation of these
animals indicates that they experience pain, too. 254
Scientist, Lynne Sneddon, cautions that it is hard for scientists to ascertain
the nature of animals' pain because it is a subjective experience. 255 She notes
that:
Whether animals can feel pain has been a controversial issue for
many years. Animals and humans share similar mechanisms of pain
detection, have similar areas of the brain involved in processing pain

Walker et al., Identifying andPreventing Pain DuringandAfter Surgery in Farm Animals, 13 5
APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCL 259, 259 (2011) (identifying surgical pain in farm animals); Amy
Simon,
Tail Docking and Castration of Lambs, ONE WELFARE
(2003),
http://essays.cve.edu.au/sites/default/files/vein essays/content_2708/SimonAmy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7B5-YWW4].
253. Sneddon, supra note 246; see also Lynne U. Sneddon et al., Do Fishes Have
Nociceptors? Evidence for the Evolution of a Vertebrate Sensory System, 270 PROC. ROYAL

SOC'Y LONDON B. 1115, 1115 (2003) (providing evidence of nociception in teleost fishes).
Somme claims that some invertebrates may be sentient and might feel pain. LAURITZ S. SOMME,
SENTIENCE AND PAIN IN INVERTEBRATES: REPORT TO THE NORWEGIAN SCIENTIFIC
COMMITTEE FOR FOOD SAFETY 14, 26-27, 35-37 (2005).

254. See K.P. Chandroo et al., Can Fish Suffer?: Perspectives on Sentience, Pain, Fear
and Stress, 86 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SC. 225, 225 (2004) (suggesting fish can experience
affective states of pain, fear, and stress); see also VICTORIA BRAITHWAITE, DO FISH FEEL PAIN?
183 (2010) (concluding that fish feel pain); Lynne U. Sneddon, Nociception or Pain in Fish, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FISH PHYSIOLOGY: FROM GENOME TO ENVIRONMENT 714 (Anthony P.

Farrell ed., 2011) (discussing potential for pain in fish); E. Lambooij et al., Welfare Aspects of
Live Chilling andFreezingof FarmedEel (AnguillaAnguilla L.): NeurologicalandBehavioural
Assessment, 210 AQUACULTURE 159, 166 (2002) (observing responses to pain stimuli in eels);
Angel A. Rivas-Boyero et al., PharmacologicalCharacterizationofa Nociceptin Receptorfrom
Zebrafish (DanioRerio), 46 J. MOLECULAR ENDOCRINOLOGY 111, 112 (2011) (noting pain in
zebrafish); Jonathan A.C. Roques et al., Tailfin Clipping, a PainfulProcedure: Studies on Nile
Tilapia and Common Carp, 101 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 533, 533 (2010) (observing pain in
common carp and Nile tilapia); Lynne U. Sneddon, Assessing Pain Perception in Fish from
Physiology to Behaviour, 146 COMP. BIOCHEMISTRY & PHYSIOLOGY S75, S78 (Supp. 2007)
(finding altered brain activity in carp afterpainful stimulation). One of the earlier studies to show
responses in invertebrates to pain was that of Fiorito. See G. Fiorito, Is There "Pain" in
Invertebrates?, 12 BEHAV. PROCESSES 383, 386 (1986) (concluding that invertebrates possess
a pain system); see also Stuart Barr et al., Nociception or Pain in a Decapod Crustacean?,75
ANIMAL BEHAV. 745, 749-50 (2008) (asserting that prolonged rubbing and grooming are
consistent with the idea of pain in crustaceans); Colin Barras, Crustacean PainResponse 'Gives
Foodfor Thought, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 10, 2007, at 14, 14; Robert W. Elwood et al., Pain and
Stress in Crustaceans?, 118 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCL 128, 134 (2009) (stating that
crustaceans may experience pain).
255. Sneddon, supra note 246.
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and show similar pain behaviours, but it is notoriously difficult to
assess how animals actually experience pain. 256
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence confirms and the international
scientific community has accepted that many animals can feel physical pain
and that they experience it in a similar manner to humans. 2 7 Various bodies
around the world (including Australia's National Health and Medical
Research Council, the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of
Laboratory Animal Care International, and the Department of Agriculture in
the United States, and the United Kingdom Animal Procedures Committee)
have prescribed guidelines for research that involves animals, which in fact
require the use of methods for reducing animals' pain in these studies. 258 In
addition, veterinarians and others who work with animals administer
analgesics and anesthetics to animals in order to minimize their pain, and
where they consider that they are observing animals suffering from
unbearable pain, they euthanize them. 25 9 Scientists have also developed tables
for measuring animals' pain levels. 260
2.

Animals' Experience of PsychologicalHarm

There is now a general consensus among scientists that animals can also
experience psychological harm. Though some regard this conclusion as a
"common-sense" one, 261 reaching it has proven difficult. The methods that
scientists have developed for measuring animals' physical pain are not
necessarily useful in ascertaining whether they experience psychological
256. Id.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 243-48.
258. "Unless there is evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that procedures and
conditions that would cause pain and distress in humans cause pain and distress in animals."
NAT'L HEALTH AND MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN CODE FOR THE CARE AND USE
OF ANIMALS FOR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES § § 1.10, 3.3.1-6 (8th ed. 2013).
259. See Rashmi Shivni, It Doesn't Have to Hurt: Recently Updated Guidelines Seek to
Improve Pain Management in SmallAnimals, J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, Oct. 14, 2015,

https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/Pages/151101a.aspx

[https://perma.cc/MP3D-

65SD]; see also AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, AVMA GUIDELINES FOR THE EUTHANASIA OF

ANIMALS 7 (2013) (recommending euthanasia when animals' lives no longer have positive net
value).
260. SARAH WOLFENSOHN & MAGGIE LLOYD, HANDBOOK OF LABORATORY ANIMAL
MANAGEMENT AND WELFARE 176-79 (1994); Patrick Bateson,Assessment ofPain in Animals,

42 ANIMAL BEHAV. 827, 834 (1991); Lucia Martini et al., Evaluation ofPain andStress Levels
ofAnimals Used in ExperimentalResearch,88 J. SURGICAL RES. 114, 116-17 (2000); Roughan
& Flecknell, supra note 250, at 403 tbl.2, 404 tbl.3.
261. David DeGrazia & Andrew Rowan, Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and
Humans, 12 THEORETICAL MED. 193, 193 (1991).
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harm. To experience this form of pain, a living being must feel particular
emotions. Yet emotions are experienced internally and often lack any external
manifestation or expression. Moreover, if animals do experience emotions,
they may exhibit them in a very different manner from humans or at least in
ways that humans do not recognize. Nevertheless, scientists have observed
that some animals, and especially those with advanced cognition, indicate that
they feel emotions. 262 Further, scientific investigation has confirmed that

"[a]natomical, physiological, and behavioral similarities across species
demonstrate that animals experience pain and distress [including
psychological pain and distress] in ways similar or identical to humans." 263
Moreover, not only do animals experience psychological harm in a similar
way to humans, but the same factors contribute to the experience of mental
suffering in both humans and other animals. 264
There have been many anecdotal observations of animals' apparent
emotional responses to both upsetting and uplifting events. For instance, in

the Mfnster Zoo in northern Germany, a gorilla, Gana, appeared to be
devastated and grief-stricken as she embraced and stroked her three-monthold baby who had died, and she gently shook the baby seemingly in an attempt
to revive it. 265 At the other end of the emotional scale, scientist Klaus Wilhelm
notes that, "[i]n the rain forests of Sumatra, orangutans swing from branches
and splash their hands into pools of water with no other apparent purpose than
just for the fun of it." 266 For many years, scientists have hypothesized that
animals such as pigs experience depression when they are confined in small
spaces and denied the opportunity to pursue behavior that is usually
undertaken by their species. 267 Some scientific studies support these
observations that animals with greater cognition, in particular, can respond
emotionally to their experiences. 268

Scientists distinguish between animals' capacity to feel primary emotions
on the one hand, such as fear and surprise, and social emotions on the other,
which demand some level of self-reflection and whose expression contributes
to the dynamics of the community in which animals live. 269 Many animals
262. Klaus Wilhelm, Do Animals Have Feelings?, SC'. AM. MIND, Feb.-Mar. 2006, at 26,
26.
263. Ferdowsian & Merskin, supra note 240, at 461.
264. Id.
265. Marcus Dunk, A Mother's Grief Heartbroken Gorilla Cradles Her Dead Baby,
DAILY MAIL (Aug. 19, 2008), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1046549/Amothers-grief-Heartbroken-gorilla-cradles-dead-baby.html [https://penna.cc/F5RZ-PVT5].
266. Wilhelm, supra note 262, at 29.
267. Ferdowsian & Merskin, supra note 240, at 453.
268. See Allen & Trestman, supra note 219.
269. Wilhelm, supra note 262, at 27 (citing ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR
SPINOZA 43-46 (2003)).
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appear to have primary emotions and especially fear. Animals with greater
cognitive ability also seem to display social emotions, 270 including sympathy,
brashness, humiliation, shame, guilt, and avarice. Biologists have observed
that some animals experience joy, too, which Wilhelm conjectures is
reflective of the operation of complex brain processes and self-awareness, and
also contributes to animals' negotiation of their relationships:
Feelings . . well up from the analytical mind. Someone who "feels
good," who experiences joy, is aware of her body being in a particular
state. The perception of such a feeling requires processing by several

somatosensory brain regions in the cerebral cortex that map parts of
the body and their condition and, simultaneously, brain activity that
assesses what those conditions mean. In essence, this processing
constitutes self-reflection . . . It is well accepted that young mammals

have an inborn drive to play, because the interaction helps them sort
out social opportunities and limits. They learn skills that will be
important to their later survival. 27 1
Significantly, according to analyses of animal and human brains'
metabolism, animals and humans share "similar physical brain processes,"
including "the neurotransmitter dopamine," which, at least in humans, leads
to them experiencing and expressing the emotion ofjoy.272
It has also been found that animals are capable of experiencing
psychological illness. 273 According to Franklin McMillan, "[a] rapidly
proliferating literature provides extensive evidence supporting the existence
of psychological trauma and its characterization in nonhuman species." 274 For
270. "Dominant gorillas swagger around to demand respect from their peers. Low-ranking
wolves in packs make gestures of abasement. Dogs reprimanded by their owners for doing
something wrong show clear signals of embarrassment. Yet even in such cases, as with primary
emotions, some neuroscientists say these actions are largely automatic and inborn and count
them among the routinized mechanisms animals use to help them survive." Wilhelm, supra note
262, at 27-28.
271. Id. at 28-29.
272. Id. at 29.
273. Shreya Dasgupta, Many Animals Can Become Mentally Ill, BBC (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150909-many-animals-can-become-mentally-ill
[https://penna.cc/HV3Y-PJEJ].
274. Franklin D. McMillan, Psychological Trauma in Animals: PTSD andBeyond, INT'L
ASS'N ANIMAL BEHAV. CONSULTANTS, no. 1, 2011, at 107, 107; see also Marc Bekoff, Animals
Don'tLaugh, Think, Get Depressed, or Love Declares a Psychiatrist,PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept.
3, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animal-emotions/201209/animals-dontlaugh-think-get-depressed-or-love-declares-psychiatrist [https://perma.cc/V9KV-4H4R]; Marc
Bekoff, Do Wild Animals Suffer From PTSD and Other PsychologicalDisorders?, PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(Nov.
29,
2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animal-
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example, research in relation to chimpanzees has shown that they can behave
in ways that suggest the existence of generalized anxiety disorders, obsessivecompulsive disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 275 A number of

studies have been published regarding the experience of post-traumatic stress
disorder also in other animals, including wolves, elephants, and dogs. 276
Similar factors have been shown to contribute to the experience of
psychological suffering in both humans and animals. 277 In studies undertaken
in relation to chimpanzees, potentially traumatic experiences endured by them
when they were the subjects of experimental research, such as confinement,
physical harm, and isolation, led to the chimpanzees developing behaviors
associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder.27 Similarly, studies in relation to dogs that
were sold as puppies through pet stores, born in commercial breeding
establishments, or both indicated an increase in behavioral and emotional
problems that cause distress, including aggression and fear, when compared
with dogs from other sources. 279 Factors that contributed to these problems
likely included stress, stimulus deprivation, and maternal separation. 20
Further, abuse, neglect, confinement, multiple re-homing, natural disasters,
fighting, racing, forced work, experiences in armed conflict, experiences as
laboratory subjects, and physical trauma and injury are cited as potential
causes of psychological trauma in animals. 281

As we have seen, scientists accept that animals are capable of
experiencing physical pain. In addition, it is clear that animals can feel
emotions and experience psychological harm. This scientific research thus
emotions/20111 1/do-wild-animals-suffer-ptsd-and-other-psychological-disorders
[https://perma.cc/LXV8-6FF6].
275. Hope R. Ferdowsian et al., Signs of GeneralizedAnxiety and Compulsive Disorders
in Chimpanzees, 7 J. VETERINARY BEHAV. 353, 360 [hereinafter Ferdowsian, Generalized
Anxiety]; Hope R. Ferdowsian et al., Signs of Mood and Anxiety Disorders in Chimpanzees,
PLOS ONE, June 2011, at 1, 9 [hereinafter Ferdowsian et al., Signs of Mood and Anxiety
Disorders].

276. McMillan, supra note 274, at 107, 109.
277. See id. at 107.
278. Ferdowsian, Generalized Anxiety, supra note 275; Chimps Used in Experiments
Develop
Psychological
Disorders,
ARCUS
FOUND.
(June
11,
2008),
https://www.arcusfoundation.org/stories-of-impact/great-apes/chimps-used-experiments-devel
op-psychological-disorders/ [https://penna.cc/GA9H-9RQ6].
279. McMillan, Outcomesfor Dogs, supra note 14, at 14.
280. Id.
281. McMillan, supra note 274, at 110; see also Jessica Pierce, EmotionalPain in Animals:
An
Invisible
World
of
Hurt,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(Apr.
24,
2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/all-dogs-go-heaven/201204/emotional-pain-inanimals-invisible-world-hurt [https://penna.cc/HV5J-AYC8] (discussing types of emotional
abuse from which animals suffer).
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provides a justification for criminalizing conduct that causes animals to suffer
physical and/or psychological pain. Moreover, if scientists can measure the
degree of pain that animals experience as a consequence of human cruelty,
this evidence can inform the application of the principle of proportionality in
determining an appropriate penalty.
B.

SocialNorms RegardingHumans'Interactionwith Animals

A strong connection exists between criminal law and normative values, 282
as contemporary norms determine the behavior that is criminalized and the
sentences that are imposed. Moreover, the law will only be respected, upheld,
and enforced if it reflects, at least to some extent, contemporary normative
values. For this reason, we argue that some current normative values should
influence definitions of animal cruelty and the law's responses to animal
cruelty offenses. Nevertheless, we do not recommend integrating all of
society's current norms regarding humans' relationships with animals into
laws relating to animal cruelty offenses. We take this position for a number of
reasons. First, social norms relating to the relationships between humans and
animals are in a state of rapid change, as evidenced by the swift rise of the
vegan movement. Second, some social norms in this context appear to conflict
with one another. For example, normative values indicate that animals should
not suffer unnecessarily, and yet it is socially acceptable and commonplace to
kill fish by tugging them out of the water with a hook in their mouths and
leaving them to suffocate, and to place lobsters while they are still alive in
boiling water to cook them. Finally, while it is important that the law reflects
social norms, it is also the case that the law has an important role to play in
helping to shape normative values. Notwithstanding these views, we now
examine some current normative values that we consider the law does need to
reflect.
We believe that it is important that law-makers acknowledge that humans
eat animals, and it is not foreseeable, at least in the near future, that killing
animals for human consumption will be criminalized. The law should take
into account other ways in which humans depend on animals, too, including
for sport, entertainment, companionship, and medical testing, which are
similarly unlikely to be abandoned imminently. Yet it is also accepted that, in
light of humans' reliance on animals, they bear responsibility for treating them
well, especially because it is recognized that they are less powerful than
people and thus vulnerable to their exploitation. Indeed, the overarching
normative value regarding the relationship between humans and animals that,
in our view should inform the law, is that humans should not cause animals to

282. Bagaric, supra note 15.
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suffer unnecessarily. Even where people kill animals for human consumption
or other purposes, it is commonly expected that this will be performed as
swiftly as possible to eliminate any gratuitous suffering that might accompany
it. The adoption of animal welfare legislation in numerous jurisdictions
indicates the importance of this value in contemporary society. Moreover, the
growth of scientific evidence that some animals are sentient and can
experience physical and psychological pain will bolster (if it has not already)
social norms that humans should not inflict pain on animals unduly.
Society still deems humans as warranting greater protection than animals,
and, as discussed above, an animal's life is not accorded the same sanctity as
that of a person. It is, therefore, imperative to compare penalties for offenses
against humans and animals because society would likely not accept the
imposition of harsher sanctions for the latter than the former.
C.

Animals'MoralStanding

As social norms are informed by morality, it is important to consider
popular moral theories in determining how the law should address human
cruelty towards animals. In particular, this philosophy can indicate if we
should take into account animals' interests in deciding whether human
behavior towards them is morally upright or not, and whether it is ethically
imperative for the law to protect them from human cruelty. In this regard, it is
especially important to ascertain whether, pursuant to the major streams of

moral theory, animals can be regarded as having moral standing. If animals
lack moral status, there is no justification for granting them any greater legal
protection than an inanimate object. Yet we argue that, according to the two

major schools of moral philosophy, animals should be accorded moral
standing and, at least in relation to one of those streams, on the basis of
scientific evidence that many animals experience pain. As discussed above,
although animals' lives are generally not regarded as being sacred, many
would consider the lives of animals with more advanced sentience and
cognition, in particular, to be intrinsically important. The notion that animals
have moral standing is consistent with this normative understanding.
Animals' moral status provides a further, and in this instance, ethical, reason
for criminalizing animal cruelty offenses and for treating those crimes as
being especially grave. We now explain these points in greater detail.
1.

Overview ofMoral Theories

In addition to the fact that animals can experience pain, another basis for
arguing that it is inappropriate to inflict cruelty on them is that they have moral
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status or standing, 283 which means that animals can be recognized as
legitimate members of the moral community who deserve protection. 284 Prior
to explaining why we maintain that animals have moral status, we provide a
brief overview of the main moral theories that justify the ascription of moral
standing.
Most moral theories fall into two broad groups, namely, consequentialist
and non-consequentialist theories. 285 According to consequentialist moral
theories, an act is right or wrong depending on its capacity to achieve a

particular outcome, such as to maximize a virtue, for instance, happiness. 286
By contrast, according to non-consequentialist (or deontological) theories, the
appropriateness of an action is not contingent upon its ability to produce
particular ends, but rather follows from the intrinsic features of the act. 287
a.

ConsequentialistTheories

The most popular consequentialist moral theory is utilitarianism. 288
Several different forms of utilitarianism have been proposed, the most
influential of which is hedonistic act utilitarianism. 289 This theory provides
that the morally right action is the one that produces the greatest amount of
happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or unhappiness. 290
According to this theory, all individuals' interests count equally to one
another, and we should act in a manner that maximizes net human wellbeing. 29 1

283. For example, Donnelly claims that there are three broad schools regarding the relative
or comparative value of man and animals. One extreme proposes animals have "no inherent
value" at all and this is based on the primacy of human welfare and scientific progress. Strachan
Donnelly, Speculative Philosophy, the Troubled Middle, and the Ethics of Animal
Experimentation, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 15, 15. At the other extreme there
are antivivisectionists and animal rights advocates who claim that "certain animals, if not all
life, have an ethical significance comparable" to that of humans. Id. Then in the middle is the
third school which not only finds an "inherent goodness in organic life and concrete values" in
individual animals, but concurrently also believes in the "goodness and value of human life." Id.
284. See id. at 21.
285. STEPHEN O' SULLIVAN & PHILIP A. PECORINO, ETHICS: AN ONLINE TEXTBOOK ch.
4, § 3 (2009) (ebook).
286. L. W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 165 (1987).
287. Id.
288. Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, InternationalHuman Rights Law: All Show,
No Go, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (2005).
289. Mirko Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument: Laying the Foundationfor a Coherent
System ofLaw, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 163, 167 (2002).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 167, 175.
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Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor in the Western world over the past
fifty to sixty years for several reasons. The main general argument against
utilitarianism is that, because it prioritizes net happiness, it fails to safeguard
fundamental individual interests. As a result of this, it has been claimed that,
in some circumstances, application of a utilitarian theory would lead to
undesirable outcomes, such as punishing the innocent. 292 For instance, a few

individuals might suffer some extreme sanction in order to quell large-scale
civil disobedience, or some people may be compelled to have their organs
removed because transplantation of them would maximize happiness by
saving the lives of others and assisting those most in need of them. 293
Another significant criticism of utilitarianism is that it is incompatible
with the concept of rights.294 Utilitarianism is a maximizing principle, as it

aims to maximize net happiness. By contrast, the notion of rights is
individualizing, as its purpose is to accord each individual certain interests
and uphold them. 295 Some critics of utilitarianism maintain that, in prioritizing
net happiness over individual sacrifices, it does not take seriously the
distinction between human beings and fails to protect certain rights and
interests, which should be regarded as paramount. 296 Another major stream of
moral theory, which we discuss next, does prioritize individual rights.
b.

Non-consequentialist(Deontological)Theories

According to non-consequentialist

or deontological

theories,

the

appropriateness of an action depends not on its ability to produce particular
ends, but rather on its intrinsic features. 297 On the basis of such theories,

consequences are either an irrelevant or subsidiary consideration in evaluating
the morality of an act. 298 The types of norms that are prioritized above
consequential considerations in these theories are often derived from sources
such as religion or the supposed state of nature. 299
292. H. J. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 180-81 (1969).
293. ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 206 (1974).

294. Bagaric & Dimopoulos, supra note 288, at 13.
295. "[Ilt has been argued that in fact rights do have a place in a utilitarian ethic, and what
is more, it is only against this background that rights can be explained and their source justified.
Utilitarianism provides a [sounder] foundation for rights than any other competing theory. For
the utilitarian, the answer to why rights exist is simple: recognition of them best promotes
general utility. Their origin accordingly lies in the pursuit of happiness. Their content is
discovered through empirical observations regarding the patterns of behavior [that] best advance
the utilitarian cause." Bagaric & Dimopoulos, supra note 288, at 14.
296. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24, 163 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).
297. SUMNER, supra note 286.
298. O' SULLIVAN & PECORINO, supra note 285.
299. See id. at ch. 7, § 1.
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Deontologists place greater importance on complying with these norms

than on producing desirable outcomes. 300 For instance, if a deontological
theory asserted that lying was morally wrong, according to this theory, one
should not lie to a would-be murderer about the true location of his intended
victim because the commission of an immoral act cannot be justified even by
the fact that it will result in positive consequences. By contrast, in this
situation, a utilitarian would lie to the would-be aggressor about the victim's
location in order to prevent the victim's death and thus maximize net human
flourishing.

The most popular deontological theories are based on rights and, in
particular, human rights. 30' These theories gained adherents, especially
following World War II due to a determination to prevent a repetition of
atrocities that occurred during that war in the future. 302 Those who subscribed
to deontological theories maintained that it would be less likely that such
egregious abuses might be committed again if individuals' innate rights were
recognized. 303 Since then, there has been an increased tendency to base moral
arguments on and express moral sentiments in terms of rights.304 As L. W.
Sumner notes, "there is virtually no area of public controversy in which rights
are not to be found on at least one side of the question-and generally on
both." 305 Indeed, the notion of human rights has, at this point in time,
supplanted the objective of maximizing utility as the leading philosophical
inspiration for those who are advocating for political and social reform.3 06
Certainly, rights claims have historically proven to be highly effective in
bringing about social change. As Tom Campbell observes, they have provided
307
"a constant source of inspiration for the protection of individual liberty."

"For example, recognition of the (universal) right to liberty resulted in the
abolition of slavery." 308 More recently, women and other disenfranchised

social groups have succeeded, at least to some extent, in improving their status
by arguing for the right of equality. 309

300. See id.
301. Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment: Punishing the
Innocent and the Compatibility of UtilitarianismandRights, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. L. PHIL. 95, 123
(1999).
302. Bagaric & Dimopoulos, supra note 288, at 6.
303. See Bagaric, supra note 301, at 99.
304. SUMNER, supra note 286, at 1 ("[T]he escalation of rights rhetoric is out of control.").
305. Id.
306. H. L. A. HART, UtilitarianismandNaturalRights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 181, 196-97 (1983).
307. TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 165 (1996).

308. Bagaric, supra note 289, at 166.
309. Id.
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Application of Consequentialist and Non-consequentialist
Theories to Justify Animals'MoralStatus

Notwithstanding the increasing popularity of non-consequentialist and,

especially, rights theories, there is an ongoing philosophical debate about
whether they are more sound than consequentialist theories. Despite the
superficial appeal of rights theories, some argue that they lack an
epistemological basis and, accordingly, it is impossible to distinguish between
real and fanciful rights, and to ascertain the respective priorities of rights that
clash with one another.310 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this Article, it is
unnecessary to reach a determination about which of these streams of moral
theory should predominate. Importantly, application of both of them leads to
the conclusion that animals have moral status, though a more compelling
argument for protecting animals' interests may be grounded in
consequentialist theories in light of scientific evidence of animals' capacity to
feel pain.
Some philosophers who subscribe to consequentialist theories have
already recognized that animals have moral status. Writers such as Scott
Wilson, in fact, justify their position on the basis that animals have
"sentience," 31' which is defined as "the capacity for sensation or feeling;"3 12
a "sentient" being has "sensation or feeling" or "the power or function of
sensation or of perception by the senses," is "responsive to sensory stimuli,"
or "feels or is capable of feeling."313 Peter Singer, whose book, Animal

Liberation, which was published in 1975, was one of the catalysts for the
emergence of the animal liberation movement, and other utilitarians,
including pathocentric bio-ethicists, focus especially on animals' ability to
feel pain, and possibly also to suffer.3 14 As we have discussed, scientific
research has now established that many vertebrates, in particular, have the
capacity to feel pain, though pain may be distinguished semantically from
suffering.

The reason why animals' capacity to feel pain, in particular justifies
ascribing to them moral status according to consequentialist theories is
evident from the writings of one of the fathers of utilitarianism, Jeremy
Bentham. Bentham stated:
310. Id.
311. Scott

Wilson,

Animals

and

Ethics,

INTERNET

ENCYCLOPEDIA

PHIL.,

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anim-eth.htm [https://penna.cc/3N94-5KYY].
312. Sentience, MACQUARIE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2009).
313. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 2.

Examine both the definitions of both "sentient" and "sentience." Id.
314. For a direct discussion of "pathocentric theory" to which this Article references, see
H. Verhoog, Defining Positive Welfare andAnimal Integrity, in 2 NAHWOA WORKSHOP 108,

113 (Malla Hovi & Roberto Garcia Trujillo eds., 2000).
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The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but
by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one
day come to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of
the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What
else is it that that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse
or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a
month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it
avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but,

Can they suffer?315

As utilitarians argue that the only considerations that are relevant to
assessing the morality of an act are whether it results in happiness or pain,
certain animals' capacity to feel pain means that, according to this moral
theory, they have interests and that those interests must be taken into account
in determining the morality of behavior towards them.3 16

Although non-consequentialist theories, and particularly rights-based
moral theories, were initially developed to address human interests,3 1 7 they
are equally applicable to animals and can similarly be deployed to justify the
position that animals have moral status and thus deserve legal protection. This
is evident from an analysis of philosophers' interpretations of the nature and
meaning of rights.

Wesley Hohfeld identified four categories of rights, namely, claim-rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities, though he considered that only claimrights fell strictly within the meaning of this term. 318 Since then, many
315. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 311 n. 1 (N.Y., Hafner Pub. Co. 1948) (1789) (emphasis added).
316. In a similar vein, pathocentric theory in this context is based on the idea that "animal
suffering is prima facie wrong.... Sentient animals are the equal [of man] in their ability to feel
pain . . [H]igher animals are given moral status by pathocentrics." Verhoog, supra note 314.
317. See generally Verhoog, supra note 314 (providing background information and
general descriptions of various non-consequentialist theories and their origins).
318. W. N. Hohfeld, defined four categories of rights: claim-rights, privileges, powers and
immunities. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 22, 36-38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920). He
qualifies this by implying that only a claim-right accords with the proper meaning of the term.
Id.
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definitions of rights have been propounded, some of which explicitly refer to
humans. For instance, John Kleinig explains that rights are "those minimum
conditions under which human beings can (that moral agents) flourish and

which ought to be secured for them, if necessary by force." 319 Likewise,
Thomas Hobbes maintained that rights reflected "the liberty each man hath,
to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature." 320 Yet it is arguable that references to humans in these definitions
merely illustrate the nature of rights, and there is no reason why they could
not be applied to animals.
There is also no theoretical impediment to applying to animals other,
broader definitions of rights, which focus on what rights endow to the holders
of them, particularly in the form of claims or entitlements. 321 For instance, H.
McCloskey maintains that rights are effectively entitlements,3 22 and Tom
Campbell clarifies that "[t]he standard view is that rights are moral
entitlements." 3 23 Alternately, T. Sprigge considers simply that "[t]he best way
of understanding . . that someone has a right to something seems to be to take
it as the claim that there are grounds for complaint on their behalf if they do
not have it." 3 24 Similarly, Geoffrey Marshall considers that a right bestows an
entitlement to benefit from the performance of obligations,3 25 while D.
Galligan defines a right as a "justified claim that an interest should be
protected by the imposition of correlative duties." 326 According to these
explanations, the holder of a right can have both a presumptive benefit-in
the sense of an indefeasible or absolute, positive entitlement to a right, such
as a right to equality-or protection-meaning a negative entitlement, such as

a right not to be deprived of one's freedom, or both. Moreover, the holder of
the right can assert it against those who seek to curtail their exercise of it.
While a right may be asserted expressly, it can also be implied on the basis
that it is assumed that the holder of it would not want it to be infringed upon.

319. John Kleinig, Human Rights, LegalRights andSocial Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS 36,
44-45 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978) (emphasis added).
320. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER,

FORME AND POWER OF A

COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 84 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell
1947) (1651) (emphasis added).
321. See Geoffrey Marshall, Rights, Options, and Entitlements, in 2 OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 228, 241 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
322. H. J. McCloskey, Rights - Some Conceptual Issues, 54 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 99,
115 (1976).
323. TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 164 (1996).
324. T. L. S. SPRIGGE, THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 216-17 (1987).

325. Marshall, supra note 321, at 241.
326. D. J. Galligan, The Right to Silence Reconsidered, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 69,
88 (1988).
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By virtue of the fact that a right must be asserted or implied, the possessor of
the right can also waive it.
Some philosophers who propound rights-based theories have already
argued that animals have rights. For instance, according to Tom Regan,

because animals, like humans, are the "subject of a life," 327 they have inherent
value and, therefore, also have the right not to be harmed, the right to aid if
that right is violated, and the right to defend themselves.3 28 Likewise, James
Rachels maintains that animals that are used for research have the right not to
be tortured,3 29 and the right to liberty. 330

'

Other philosophers have proposed certain preconditions to the holding of
rights that, at first glance, seem to restrict their possession to humans. Yet, on
closer examination, these arguments do not preclude the application of rightsbased moral theories to animals. For instance, H. L. A. Hart maintains that, to
have a right, the holder of it must be capable of electing whether or not to
exercise it, which appears to restrict its application to humans. 33
Nevertheless, society recognizes that various classes of people, including
young children and severely intellectually-disabled people, have rights
regardless of the fact that they may not be able to choose whether to exercise
them. In any event, many animals' attempts to avoid pain can be interpreted
as demonstrating that they have chosen to exercise their right to be free from
cruelty. Any argument that the holder of a right must expressly elect to
exercise it and that he or she cannot implicitly exercise it is indefensible, as it
would mean that people could have their rights infringed upon when
circumstances prevent them from exercising them, such as when they are
asleep or unconscious.
Another philosopher, Michael Tooley, maintains that a right to life is only
available to an entity that wishes to continue existing as a being that
experiences life and particular mental states.33 2 While, superficially, it might
seem that only humans have a right to life on this account, as discussed above,
scientists have observed that certain animals are aware of their ongoing
existence, and therefore have a preference for living over dying, and some
animals are conscious of their mental states.333 Moreover, if we extrapolate
327. TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 243 (1983).

328. Id.
329. James Rachels, Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND
HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 122, 124 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989).
330. Id. at 125.
331. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175 (1955).
332. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in APPLIED ETHICS 57, 69 (Peter Singer
ed., 1986).
333. See PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE: MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICE 17093 (1992) (using examples in the animal kingdom to explain and support instances of animal
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Tooley's prerequisites for the existence of the right to life to an examination
of whether or not there is a specific right to be free from pain, for a being to
enjoy this right, it would need to be capable of desiring the benefits that are
consequent upon the exercise of that right.33 4 As pain is, by its nature,
undesirable, in light of scientific evidence that many animals experience pain,
they would possess this right, too.

It is therefore clear that the definitions of rights that have been proposed
do not preclude animals' possession of them. Moreover, any definition of
rights that seeks to confine their application to humans simply on the basis
that they belong to a privileged class could be forcefully challenged on the
basis that it is speciesist, that is, it favors humans over all other species. 335
Rachels believes that speciesism warrants receiving the same condemnation
as racism and sexism. 336 Speciesism is particularly unjustifiable given that
many animals share important human characteristics, including that they have
a lifespan, thoughts, and emotions, and the cognitive functionality of some
animals, such as dolphins, exceeds that of small children and severely
intellectually-disabled people.337 Especially significant is that, as we have
discussed, scientific evidence confirms that animals can experience similar
physical pain to humans, and some animals can suffer psychological harm,
too. Michael Fox originally argued that only humans could belong to a "moral
community," which he defined: "[A] social group composed of interacting
autonomous beings where moral concepts and precepts can evolve and be
understood. It is also a social group in which mutual recognition of autonomy
and personhood exist." 338

Fox claimed that animals were excluded from this community because
they lacked self-awareness, the ability to accept responsibility for their
actions, and the capacity to use sophisticated language. 339 Nevertheless, after
acknowledging that some humans with limited cognitive abilities also did not
share those traits, Fox retracted his former view and stated, "our basic moral
consciousness). See generally Smith, supra note 226 (discussing the self-awareness of animals
as well as animal mental states through a series of scientific experiments).
334. See Tooley, supra note 332, at 66-67.
335. For a discussion of confining the application of rights, see generally Hugh LaFollette
& Niall Shanks, The Origin ofSpeciesism, 71 PHIL. 41 (1996).
336. JAMES RACHELS,
DARWINISM 181 (1990).

CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF

337. See id. at 185-87 (discussing the similarities between humans and animals and
discussing treatment of humans with disabilities in relation to rationality); see also Peter Singer,
All Animals are Equal, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS, supra note 329, at 73,

80-81.
338. MICHAEL ALLEN Fox, THE CASE FOR
EVOLUTIONARY AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 50 (1986).

ANIMAL

EXPERIMENTATION:

AN

339. Id. at 57-58.
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obligations to avoid causing harm to other people should be extended to
animals."3 40 Any other basis on which it is alleged that only humans can hold

rights is as arbitrary a form of discrimination as the notion that belonging to a
particular species is a precondition to possessing rights.
3.

Rebutting the Use of ContractualistMoral Theories to Deny
Animals Moral Status

Philosophers who subscribe to another influential stream of moral
theories that focus on ideals rather than rights have denied that animals have
moral standing. One of those theories is titled "contractualism," which Peter
Carruthers, a proponent of it, explains, "views morality as the result of an
imaginary contract between rational agents, who are agreeing upon rules to
govern their subsequent behavior." 3 41 Carruthers argues that animals lack

moral status for the reason that they cannot be classified as rational agents.3 42
Although animals may have beliefs and desires, Carruthers considers that they
lack other crucial preconditions of rational agency, namely, the capacity to
conceptualize and follow general social rules, plan for the future, and conceive
of different potential futures.3 43 Another philosopher, John Rawls, who has
developed a contractualist theory of justice, acknowledges that "it is wrong to
be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great
evil. 344 The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life

of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and
humanity in their case."3 45 Yet Rawls also argues that only "moral persons,"
whom he defines as those who are capable of conceiving of their own good
based on their rational plans for life and sense of justice, are entitled to equal
justice. 346 Consequently, Rawls believes that animals are "outside the scope
of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract
doctrine so as to include them in a natural way."3 47
Nevertheless, contractualism is inherently anthropocentric and speciesist.
It is, therefore, unreasonable to rely on it to deny animals moral status.
Moreover, if taken to its logical conclusion, its application would mean that
some humans also lack moral standing, a notion that does not align with
340. See id. at 80.
341. CARRUTHERS, supra note 333, at 35.
342. See id. at 105, 143.
343. See id. at 139, 145.
344. RAWLS, supra note 296, at 448.
345. John Rawls, Outside the Scope of the Theory of Justice, in POLITICAL THEORY AND
ANIMAL RIGHTS 154, 156 (Paul A. B. Clarke & Andrew Linzey eds., 1990).
346. Id. at 155.
347. Id. at 156.
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current social norms. Contractualism assesses whether entities have moral
standing based exclusively on a capacity that only some humans-namely,
adults with high cognitive capabilities-possess, that is, the ability to enter
into a social contract.3 48 According to this theory, animals are precluded from
obtaining moral status, are morally inferior to humans, and cruelty towards
them can be justified on this basis. 349 Yet, as Regan observes, this theory could
equally be deployed to argue that some humans, such as young children and
intellectually-disabled adults, lack moral status; they, too, cannot be described
as rational agents if rational agents are defined as those who possess the
capacity to enter into contracts.350
4.

ConclusionRegardingAnimals' MoralStatus

The above discussion confirms that the most persuasive reason for
maintaining that animals have moral standing is that scientific investigation
has proven that many animals are sentient and feel pain. Particularly from a
consequentialist theoretical perspective, such as utilitarianism, this evidence
confirms that animals have interests that must be factored into an assessment
of the morality of any behavior towards them, with the overriding objective
of maximizing happiness and reducing pain. Although non-consequentialist
theories, and particularly rights-based theories, were not initially conceived to
apply to animals, there is no definitional reason why they could not so apply.
Moreover, attempts to restrict their application to humans could be discredited
on the basis that they are unduly speciesist. As it is similarly speciesist and
anthropocentric because it is based on characteristics possessed mainly by
high-functioning humans, contractualism, therefore, also cannot be relied on
to deny animals moral status.
Given the strong connection between the law and morality, 35' the finding
that animals have moral standing provides an ethical justification for
according their interests legal protection. Animals' interests are, in some
respects, different from those of humans, and the law must reflect those
differences. It is unnecessary, for instance, to give animals the right to vote or
own property. Nevertheless, as many animals, like humans, can feel pain, they
348. See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 329, at 105, 106. See generally CARRUTHERS, supra note 333, at 3536 (explaining the prerequisite requirements to establish moral standing under a contractualist
approach).
349. See Regan, supra note 348, at 106-07. But see CARRUTHERS, supra note 333, at 99,
105 (arguing that, although animals lack moral standing under a contractualism approach,
cruelty towards them is nevertheless unjustified due to the potential indirect moral significance
animals may have).
350. See Regan, supra note 348, at 106-08.
351. See Bagaric, supra note 15, at 188.
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equally have an interest in being free of it. Protection of this interest
necessitates criminalizing acts that inflict pain on animals and punishing
offenders who commit animal cruelty offenses to reflect the seriousness of
this behavior.
V.

REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS

In this part of the Article, we provide a summary of our recommendations
for changes to the law concerning animal cruelty offending by focusing first
on the categorization of those offenses and then examining the sentencing of
them. We conceive this proposal as a model for reform in all jurisdictions of
the United States.
A.

The Nature and Scope ofAnimal Cruelty Offenses

To ensure that acts of animal cruelty are criminalized appropriately and
consistently, we propose the development of a classification of animal cruelty
offenses. There are many different forms of human cruelty towards animals,
and many different species of animals are victims of it. To determine which
acts should be criminalized and which animals should be protected from
human cruelty, we recommend that classification of these offenses draw on
science, social norms, and moral philosophy. We now explain how each of
these matters can inform this categorization.
Scientific research into animals' physiology and psychology can help to
identify the impact that human cruelty has on particular species of animals,
and thus which acts should be penalized. As we have seen, scientific
investigation has already established that many vertebrates, in particular, are
capable of feeling physical pain.35 2 Scientific research suggests that some
animals, and particularly those with more advanced cognition, can also
experience psychological harm.353 As further scientific investigation uncovers
with greater precision which animals can feel physical pain, the nature of the
pain that they feel, and which animals are capable of experiencing
psychological distress, this evidence should inform the human acts of cruelty
towards animals that are categorized as crimes.
The extent to which scientific research influences the classification of
animal cruelty offenses must nonetheless be subject to current normative
values. If recommendations for reforms to this area of the law do not take into
account present social norms concerning human interaction with animals, they
may be completely disregarded. While substantial changes to the law might
352. See Ferdowsian & Merskin, supra note 240, at 451.
353. See McMillan et al., Characteristicsof Canine Victims, supra note 14, at 104-05;
McMillan, Outcomesfor Dogs, supra note 14.
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be considered ideal, it would be overly ambitious, impractical, and potentially
self-defeating to propose them all at this point in time if they are likely to be
rejected. History demonstrates that worthy legal developments often arise
through a series of incremental shifts that occur in tandem with evolving social
norms,354 though they can shape those norms, too. For instance, while many
would consider it logically and morally incontestable that African Americans
should have the same rights and privileges as the rest of the community, it
would have been futile to suggest in 1865, when slavery was abolished, that
African Americans should receive full civil and social equality. In fact,
African Americans were only accorded voting rights about fifty years ago.3 55
Alarmingly, African Americans still experience significant discrimination and
social and economic disadvantage.3 56
While the notion that humans should not cause animals to suffer accords
with contemporary normative values, even if scientific evidence confirms that
human cruelty towards animals induces such suffering, society will not accept
that all behavior that has this outcome should be criminalized. It is crucial that
any reform proposal acknowledges that many current popular social customs
and practices in the United States involve animals, cause them some harm,
and even kill them. At present, notwithstanding the growth of veganism,
animals, and products derived from them, remain a dominant staple of many
people's diets. Billions of animals are killed annually for human
consumption. 357 People continue to use animal products, such as leather and
hide, to create clothing, accessories, and make-up. In addition, people enjoy
sports that depend on animals' involvement, including equestrian sports, and
horse and dog racing. Circuses also use animals to perform tricks, and animals
are kept in zoos for human observation. Many people fish and hunt animals,
such as ducks, rabbits, deer, and birds, for entertainment and food. Certain
animals, such as rabbits, are killed if they are deemed to be pests, for instance,
to farmed crops. Scientific experiments are regularly conducted on animals in
order to develop medical and other treatments for humans. Wholesale
criminalization of these human interactions with animals would undoubtedly
attract substantial opposition.

354. See generally DUNCAN GREEN, How CHANGE HAPPENS 48-49 (2016) (explaining
from a historical lens how shifting social norms can characterize notable legal changes as well).
355. Deborah N. Archer, Still Fighting After All These Years: Minority Voting Rights 50
Years After the March on Washington, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 69, 69 (2014).
356. Racial Disparity, SENTENCING PROJECT (2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
issues/racial-disparity/ [https://perma.cc/V8KR-MS4U] (providing articles that discuss ongoing
issue in racial disparity among the incarcerated population).
357. Bas Sanders, GlobalAnimal Slaughter Statistics and Charts,FAUNALYTICS (Oct. 10,
2018), https://faunalytics.org/global-animal-slaughter-statistics-and-charts/
[https://perma.cc
/F65E-RRN2].
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Nevertheless, the public would likely welcome measured reforms that
penalize some human acts of cruelty that cause what is deemed to be
gratuitous physical pain in or psychological harm to animals that have more
advanced cognitive capacities and sentience in particular. People seem to hold
greater respect for animals that demonstrate that they share, to some extent,
human capacities of thinking and feeling. Therefore, while they might object
to criminalizing an act of cruelty against an ant or slug, they would be open to
penalizing such behavior towards a dog or monkey. It may, therefore, be
impracticable at this point in time to contend that acts of cruelty towards
invertebrates with less cognitive capacities and sentience than fish should be
punished. In addition, society may deem some suffering inflicted upon
animals to be necessary. For instance, it might be considered vital (though
unfortunate) to cause significant pain to a small number of animals for the
purpose of undertaking research to find a cure for human disease. Yet the
public would probably recognize that it is possible for humans to continue
depending on animals without inflicting undue suffering on them. If animals

are killed for the purpose of using their bodies for scientific research, food,
sport, or clothing, this can be performed swiftly to ensure that they experience
minimal physical pain. Likewise, measures can be introduced into sports that
involve animals so that they do not suffer unnecessarily from participating in
them. The community would likely accept the imposition of penalties on
people who do not take these steps to prevent certain animals' undue
suffering.

The appropriate definition of animal cruelty has long been the subject of
debate among scholars, clinicians, and policymakers. 358 Yet many social
scientists have adopted a definition proposed by Ascione in 1993, namely, that
animal cruelty is "socially unacceptable behavior that intentionally causes
unnecessary pain, suffering, or distress to and/or death of an animal." 359 This
definition is intended to encompass "cruelty that may be psychological in
nature." 360 In addition, it purposely excludes socially approved practices

related to the treatment or use of animals in veterinary practices and livestock
production or other animal husbandry practices and in hunting and in
laboratory research, 3 61 which are also socially acceptable forms of animal
cruelty. 362 We consider that it would align with current normative values to
adapt this definition for use in legislation that criminalizes human cruelty
towards animals.
358. Hensley et al., supra note 10, at 489.
359. Frank R. Ascione, Children Who Are Cruel to Animals: A Review ofResearch and
Implicationsfor Developmental Psychology, 6 ANTHROZOOS 226, 228 (1993).
360. See Longobardi & Badenes-Ribera, supra note 181, at 201.
361. Ascione, supra note 359; Longobardi & Badenes-Ribera, supra note 181, at 201.
362. Id.
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Importantly, popular moral philosophy that informs social norms supports
reforms to the law that would penalize acts of human cruelty towards
vertebrates with high sentience that cause them to suffer physical or
psychological pain. On the basis of consequentialist and non-consequentialist
moral theories, it is clear that certain animals have moral standing, and
therefore, their suffering as a consequence of human acts should be taken into
account in determining whether that behavior is morally right or wrong and

should be punished.
To summarize then, initial proposals for classification of animal cruelty
offenses could focus on human behavior that causes unnecessary, significant
physical pain in or psychological harm to vertebrates with high sentience
whom scientific evidence has confirmed can feel such pain. Animals'
suffering that is deemed unnecessary might need to be determined on a case
by case basis. These changes should penalize cruelty towards animals that are
farmed and used in research, sport, and other entertainment, in addition to
companion animals. Acts of cruelty toward animals that result in those
animals' death should be included in a classification of animal cruelty
offenses where they have a traumatic impact on humans that have a
relationship with those animals. A relation may exist, for example, if the
animals are pets, the animals depended on the killed animals, or both.
It is likely that some human behavior that meets this broad definition of
animal cruelty is currently socially accepted. Criminalization of some of this
behavior could nonetheless raise awareness of its impact on sentient animals.
We consider that further reform to animal cruelty law should be pursued in
the future to criminalize a wider range of human behavior towards animals.
Once initial changes are incorporated into existing laws, it will then be
possible to make further incremental and meaningful reforms to animal
cruelty law in a linear, ongoing manner, which reflect emerging scientific
evidence about animals' physiological and psychological constitution, and
their experience of pain, as well as evolving social norms.
B.

Calibration of Sanctionsfor Animal Cruelty Offenses

Sentencing jurisprudence has hitherto developed in relation to crimes that
involve human victims. Nevertheless, this is not an impediment to
establishing a model approach to sentencing for animal cruelty crimes. This
is especially the case because, as we have discussed, animals can experience
similar pain to humans; according to current social norms, it is inappropriate

for humans to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily; and popular
philosophical theories establish that animals, like humans, have moral status
and therefore deserve legal protection from acts of cruelty. Moreover, it is
fitting to apply the same sentencing objectives and principles that have proven

Published by Scholar Commons,

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8
442

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 385]

effective in determining penalties for crimes committed against people to
calibrating sanctions for animal cruelty offenses.
The sentencing objective of community protection might not intuitively
seem relevant to crimes that are committed against animals. Nevertheless, as
we have seen, animal cruelty offenders can pose a risk to the public. This is
especially the case because, as research has established, there can be a strong
connection between people's acts of cruelty towards animals and their
commission of offenses against other people. 363 In sentencing animal cruelty
offenders, we, therefore, propose that courts should attempt to achieve the aim
of community protection to some degree. We also consider that judges should
focus on the sentencing objective of rehabilitation to the extent that an
offender's demonstration of a high probability of reform may constitute a
mitigating factor. Yet the major principle that should inform sentencing of
animal cruelty offenders is proportionality so that the severity of the sanctions
that are imposed matches the seriousness of the crimes that they have
committed.
In applying the principle of proportionality, it is important to assess the

impact of an animal cruelty offense. To this end, it is telling that cruelty
offenses constitute the gravest crime that can be committed against animals,
and can be even more serious than killing them. Animals cannot necessarily
communicate the suffering that acts of cruelty inflict on them in the same way
as humans. Nevertheless, as we have seen, scientific investigation has
confirmed that such acts can cause certain vertebrates to experience
significant physical pain, which is similar to the pain felt by humans, and
psychological harm.3 64 The degree and duration of pain inflicted on an animal
should inform the evaluation of the seriousness of the animal cruelty offense.
For instance, an act of animal cruelty will be deemed especially grave if it
causes the animal to suffer from pain that is intense, persistent, and endures
for a long time.
Also, in calculating the gravity of an animal cruelty offense, it will be
important for a court to begin by considering the sanction that would be
imposed if an act of cruelty was committed against a human. Scientific
evidence about the physiology of a dog, for instance, may indicate that, if it is
beaten, the dog will experience the same degree of pain as a person who is the
victim of the same crime. It is, however, too ambitious to suggest that the
same punishment should be imposed for both acts. As we have noted,
according to current normative values, while certain animals have moral status
and their lives are intrinsically important, they are not regarded as being as
sacred as humans' lives. Consequently, society would accept that a penalty
363. Longobardi & Badenes-Ribera, supra note 181, at 202.
364. See van Loon et al., supra note 251, at 641; McMillan et al., Characteristicsof Canine
Victims, supra note 14, at 104-05.
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for an animal cruelty offense is calibrated by taking the sanction prescribed
for an offense of cruelty against a human and discounting accordingly. The
complex question that nonetheless arises concerns the extent of the discount
that should be accorded to the sentence of the offender who is cruel to an
animal. There is no clear answer to this question. Yet, for reforms relating to
sentencing of animal cruelty offenses to be viable, it is important that the
penalties imposed for them are meaningfully lower than those imposed for
similar conduct against humans, but still substantial enough to reflect their
seriousness. The harshness of the penalty imposed could then be adjusted to
achieve the objective of community protection, and respond to any relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors (such as an offender's good prospects of

rehabilitation).
The current sentencing system in the United States is overly punitive as a
consequence of a misguided "tough-on-crime" approach that politicians, for
decades, assumed was popular with voters.3 65 The result of this policy is that
the United States has the highest incarceration levels on Earth, and by a wide
margin.3 66 This trend is only now receding, reflected in a lowering of the
prison population since 2013,367 and a loose consensus emerging among both

Republican and Democratic politicians that "tough-on-crime" is a flawed
policy and a more evidence-based approach to crime and punishment is
necessary.3 68 However, excessively harsh penalties are often still imposed for
a range of offenses.3 69 If this approach persists, animal cruelty offenders
should often receive lengthy prison terms in the order of five years and more.
As we have seen, the maximum penalty for animal cruelty offenses in some
jurisdictions already exceeds this level, 370 as does federal law, 371 and hence,
there is certainly scope for courts to impose adequate penalties on animal

cruelty offenders.
Nevertheless, if a more progressive approach to sentencing is adopted

generally, which is driven primarily by the principle of proportionality, there
will be a reduction in the harshness of penalties imposed for most offenses. In
365. Mirko Bagaric et al., Trauma and Sentencing: The Case for MitigatingPenalty for
ChildhoodPhysical and SexualAbuse, 30 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 6 (2019).
366. Id.
367. Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing
Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly) Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing
Knowledge andPractice, 25 GEo. MASON L. REv. 653, 665 (2018).
368. Maggie Astor, On This Issue, Both Sides Concede They Were Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2019, at A18.
369. See Bagaric et al., supra note 365, at 19-21.
370. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 42.09(a)-(c) (West, Westlaw thmugh2019 Reg. Sess.); see
also id. § 12.34(a) (Westlaw). In tandem, these two laws can work together to create a penalty
for certain animal cruelty violations exceeding five years.
371. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-72).

Published by Scholar Commons,

59

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

444

[VOL. 71: 385]

light of the recent lowering of prison numbers and political recognition that
reform of sentencing law is essential, it is feasible that such a system could be
introduced.3 72 Pursuant to a model sentencing system, offenders who commit
the most serious animal cruelty crimes might still receive prison sentences,
but they would not need to be particularly lengthy given that research has
shown that incarceration does not lower the rate of commission of crimes or
recidivism. 373 We suggest the imposition of a maximum term of imprisonment
of seven years, in line with the maximum sentence of imprisonment under the
PACT Act, for the most grave animal cruelty offenses. This term could be
increased to eight years if the crime results in the death of an animal that is
aware of its ongoing existence and has a clear preference for remaining alive,
if it causes distress to a human (most typically where the animal is a person's
pet), the suffering of another animal that depends on the animal that is killed
(for example, where the animal that is killed was nurturing its offspring), or
all of the above.
It could also be appropriate to place many offenders who commit animal
cruelty offenses on probation for a period of up to two years. This courtimposed order mandating correctional supervision in the community is
normally ordered as an alternative to incarceration,3 74 and is harsher than a
fine. Offenders who are placed on probation are normally subjected to a
number of restrictions. The most important condition is that they not commit
any further offenses.3 75 Other requirements typically include geographical
restrictions (for example, constraints on where an offender can reside and
travel), behavioral restrictions, such as a prohibition on consuming drugs and
alcohol, 376 and attendance at meetings with corrections officers who monitor
the orders.3 77

In determining the appropriate penalty for animal cruelty offenses, it
should not be relevant whether the animal is domesticated, wild, particularly
vulnerable, or even destined for slaughter. All of these animals would
experience the same level of pain regardless of their circumstances. This
approach is, in fact, consistent with that adopted recently in New Zealand,
which is one of the few countries where courts have considered the relevance
of animals' sentience to the sentencing calculus.3 78

372. See Astor, supra note 368.
373. See Bagaric et al., supra note 365, at 43.
374. See DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 5-6 (2015).

375.
376.
377.
378.

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a), 3583(d) (2018).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d) (2018).
Id. §§ 3563(b)(15)-(18).
See Erickson v. Ministryfor PropertyIndustries [2017] NZCA 271 at [58](a).
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For the purpose of determining the practical effect (if any) of animals'
sentience, the Court of Appeal in the case of Ericksonv. Ministerfor Property

Industries [2017]379 examined the brutal treatment of bobby calves by a
casually employed slaughterman. The defendant, Erickson, pleaded guilty to
charges brought against him under §§ 28(1)(d), 12(c), 28A(1)(d), 29(a), and
12(a) of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (N.Z.). 380 These offenses included
willful ill-treatment of a calf with the result that it was seriously injured or
impaired, killing a calf in such a manner that it suffered unreasonable or
unnecessary pain or distress, reckless ill-treatment of calves with the result
that they were seriously injured or impaired, and failure to meet their physical
health and behavioral needs. 381The court of appeal's judgment was concerned
with sentencing Erickson for these offenses, and more generally with giving
sentencing courts guidance on the question of which considerations should
determine the gravity of offending in cases of willful and reckless ill-treatment
of animals.38 2 The court noted that the vulnerability of animals is not an
aggravating factor, because all animals are necessarily vulnerable in the face
of human cruelty, and therefore, this is already factored into sentencing. 383
The court also held that the fact that animals are destined to be food products
does not constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing animal cruelty
offenders .384
VI. CONCLUSION

Humans inflict an enormous amount of suffering on animals. Legislation
in every American state prohibits acts of animal cruelty to varying degrees.
Yet offenders can receive varied penalties for the same crimes in different
states. This is not surprising, given that there is a lack of consistent definitions
of animal cruelty, most definitions do not encompass the variety of acts of
animal cruelty that are committed, and there is no developed or coherent
jurisprudence about the objectives, principles, and other matters that should
guide courts in their sentencing of animal cruelty offenders. This Article
attempts to fill this void by proposing a model approach to classifying and
sentencing animal cruelty offenses, which we consider should apply
uniformly throughout the United States.

An ideal classification of animal cruelty offenses would refer to different
forms of animal cruelty offending and criminalize behavior towards animals

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at [1]-[12].
Id. at [4](a)-(e).
Id.
Id. at [1]-[2].
Id. at [51].
Id. at [57].
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that causes animals to suffer unnecessarily. Further, it would not discriminate
against animals on the basis of human-use typologies, but instead would
include crimes against animals that are farmed and used in research, sport, and
entertainment, as well as companion animals. Given that science has
established that some animals, in particular, vertebrates, have greater
sentience and capacity to feel pain than other animals, it would also
distinguish between animals on the basis of sentience.
This proposed sentencing framework would not aim to achieve the
objectives of general and specific deterrence, as both are unattainable through
the imposition of harsher sanctions. The sentencing objective of rehabilitation
may be pursued to the extent that an offender's demonstration of his or her
reasonable likelihood of reform may be a mitigating factor. Further, courts
would attempt to achieve the sentencing aim of community protection to some
degree, especially given that animal cruelty can potentially lead to and cooccur with commission of acts of cruelty against humans. In ascertaining
appropriate penalties for animal cruelty offenses, the main determinant should
be the principle of proportionality, which prescribes that the severity of the
sanction should match the seriousness of the crime. The only manner in which
to calculate this equation rationally, even in a crude way, is to ascertain the
level of pain caused by animal cruelty offenses.
As we have seen, scientific research has confirmed that many vertebrates
are capable of experiencing physical pain, which resembles the pain felt by
humans, and psychological harm. 385 The poignancy of this pain cannot be
discounted meaningfully by the fact that the pain is experienced by animals
instead of humans. Also, as we have discussed, the notion that humans should
not inflict suffering on animals unduly accords with current normative values

and with moral theories pursuant to which it is apparent that animals, like
humans, have moral standing. In light of this, conduct that subjects animals to
significant suffering is particularly grave. The severity of an animal cruelty
offense would be increased by the degree and duration of the pain that is
inflicted on an animal. The gravity of an animal cruelty offense would be
aggravated by the fact that it leads to the animal's death if scientific evidence
confirms that it is conscious of its ongoing existence and would clearly prefer
to remain alive. Additionally, one must consider whether a human has a
traumatic response to its death, its death leads to the extreme suffering of
another animal that depends on it, or both. Therefore, this further suffering
that may result from an act of animal cruelty needs to be factored into the
overall harm caused by the offending.
As we have discussed, in proposing changes to animal cruelty laws, it is
important initially to recommend measured reforms that are largely consistent
385. See van Loon et al., supra note 251, at 641; McMillan et al., Characteristicsof Canine
Victims, supra note 14, at 104-05.
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with current social norms regarding humans' interaction with animals. Once
these changes are incorporated into existing laws, it will then be possible to
make incremental adjustments, consistent with emerging evidence about
animals' capacities and with evolving social norms.
In concrete terms, we propose that animal cruelty offenses should be
confined to acts that inflict physical or psychological pain on vertebrates,
regardless of whether they are used by humans in some way. In the ideal
sentencing system, the standard penalty that should be applied for offenses of
this nature is probation of two years and, for more serious offenses, a prison
sentence of between two and three years in length. These changes to the law
would acknowledge animals' moral status and the impact of cruelty offenses
on them and harmonize this area of the law with scientific knowledge
regarding the physiology and psychology of animals. Such a proposal would
provide a basis for making further reforms in the future in response to
emerging scientific research regarding animals' sentience and developing
normative values concerning humans' interaction with animals.
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